The Essentials
Intel as of Sep 07, 2026
- Haiti seeks UN re-authorisation of Gang Suppression Force ahead of 30 September expiry — Foreign Minister Raina Forbin formally asked the Security Council on 4 September 2026 to renew the mandate of the Gang Suppression Force, authorised …
- US lethal maritime strike campaign resumes under new Joint Task Force Western Hemisphere — SOUTHCOM activated Joint Task Force Western Hemisphere on 4 August 2026 under Maj. Gen. Kevin Jarrard, replacing the ad hoc Operation Southern Spear …
- Viv Ansanm massacre at Kenscoff underscores gang expansion toward Petion-Ville — On the night of 23 August 2026 the Viv Ansanm coalition stormed central Kenscoff, attacking a church sheltering displaced families and killing at lea…
Threat level changes vs Aug 28
▼
Guyana
ELEVATED
from HIGH
●
Curaçao
ELEVATED
▲
Suriname
MODERATE
from LOW
●
Saint Lucia
LOW
●
Saint Vincent & Grenadines
LOW
Latest
Threat Intensity
Critical High Elevated Low
Critical High Elevated Low
Country Threat Matrix
| Level | Assessment | |
|---|---|---|
Haiti
|
CRITICAL | Gang coalitions control most of Port-au-Prince; at least 47 killed at Kenscoff on 23 August 2026 and roughly 1,408 killed nationwide in Q2. The Gang Suppression Force is at 1,083 of an authorised 5,550 personnel with its mandate expiring 30 September, and 13 December elections are of doubtful feasibility. |
Cuba
|
HIGH | Sixth nationwide grid collapse of 2026 on 3 August, exhausted fuel reserves following the January US oil blockade, and localised protests. Economic contraction and service breakdown are driving renewed irregular maritime migration risk. |
Trinidad & Tobago
|
HIGH | State of emergency in force since 3 March 2026 against gang violence, frontline exposure to US strike operations in the Gulf of Paria approaches, and a high-stakes bet on Venezuelan Dragon gas to arrest declining domestic production. |
Guyana
|
ELEVATED | Unresolved Essequibo claim with an ICJ merits judgment pending after the 4-11 May 2026 hearings, plus emerging exposure as a cocaine transshipment hub as interdiction displaces routes east. Oil output near 918,000 bpd raises both the stakes and the target value. |
Dominican Republic
|
ELEVATED | Deported 194,465 Haitians in the first eight months of 2026, sustaining acute border friction and reception-capacity failure on the Haitian side. Membership in the Americas Counter Cartel Coalition deepens alignment with US regional operations. |
Puerto Rico
|
ELEVATED | Principal US logistics and air-bridge hub for Caribbean operations via Muniz ANG Base and the reactivated Roosevelt Roads facility at Ceiba, hosting several thousand personnel. Status confers force-protection and retaliation exposure without local policy control. |
| Curaçao Curaçao | ELEVATED | Hosts a US forward operating location run by the 429th Expeditionary Operations Squadron within 70km of the Venezuelan coast. Defence policy sits with the Kingdom of the Netherlands, leaving Willemstad exposed to decisions it does not make. |
| Aruba Aruba | ELEVATED | Co-located US forward operating location and proximity to the Venezuelan littoral place the island inside the operational area of counter-narcotics strike activity. Tourism-dependent economy is sensitive to any airspace or shipping disruption. |
Jamaica
|
MODERATE | Homicides fell 43 percent in 2025 to 649 and January 2026 recorded the lowest monthly figure since data collection began in 2001. Principal vulnerability is reconstruction from Hurricane Melissa, at US$12.2 billion or roughly 57 percent of 2024 GDP. |
Suriname
|
MODERATE | Advancing toward first oil from the TotalEnergies-operated GranMorgu project in 2028, but institutionally thin and increasingly exposed to eastward-shifting cocaine trafficking routes through the Guianas. |
Bahamas
|
MODERATE | Stable following the 12 May 2026 general election returning Prime Minister Davis, with tourism-led growth projected to continue. Exposure runs through maritime migration flows from Haiti and Cuba and drug transshipment through the archipelago. |
Belize
|
MODERATE | GDP growth projected at about 2.5 percent for 2026, with persistent gang homicide pressure in Belize City and a location on Central American cocaine corridors. |
Barbados
|
LOW | Stable governance with real GDP growth forecast at 2.5 to 3.0 percent for 2026 and an active regional diplomatic role, hosting the Third Regional Conference on Reparations on 18-19 September. Indirect risk is limited to insurance, airspace and shipping-cost effects from southern Caribbean tension. |
Saint Lucia
|
LOW | Stable democratic institutions and tourism-led recovery, with no direct exposure to Venezuela-related military activity. Residual risk is small-island vulnerability to late-season storms and localised violent crime. |
| Saint Vincent & Grenadines Saint Vincent & Grenadines | LOW | Politically stable and outside the principal strike operating area, though its position on the Southern Caribbean Corridor makes it a secondary transshipment and small-arms trafficking concern as routes shift east. |
Caribbean Market Indicators
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Key Developments
- Haiti seeks UN re-authorisation of Gang Suppression Force ahead of 30 September expiry CRITICAL Foreign Minister Raina Forbin formally asked the Security Council on 4 September 2026 to renew the mandate of the Gang Suppression Force, authorised by Resolution 2793 on 30 September 2025 and due to lapse on 30 September 2026. Security Council Report's September forecast notes the GSF fielded only 1,083 military personnel and 16 civilian staff as of 8 July against an authorised ceiling of 5,550, and will not reach full operational capacity before year-end. The United States and Panama as co-penholders are weighing a technical rollover, which would preserve the mandate without generating force flow ahead of elections scheduled for 13 December.
- US lethal maritime strike campaign resumes under new Joint Task Force Western Hemisphere CRITICAL SOUTHCOM activated Joint Task Force Western Hemisphere on 4 August 2026 under Maj. Gen. Kevin Jarrard, replacing the ad hoc Operation Southern Spear and institutionalising command of counter-cartel operations alongside the 18-nation Americas Counter Cartel Coalition. Strikes resumed on 23-24 August after a 63-day pause, with a further vessel destroyed on 25 August killing four. The Intercept reported on 2 September 2026 a cumulative toll of roughly 227 killed in at least 68 strikes since September 2025, amid an unresolved legal dispute over the 'non-international armed conflict' framing and a congressional withholding of 25 percent of OSD travel funds pending release of strike footage.
- Viv Ansanm massacre at Kenscoff underscores gang expansion toward Petion-Ville CRITICAL On the night of 23 August 2026 the Viv Ansanm coalition stormed central Kenscoff, attacking a church sheltering displaced families and killing at least 47 people while torching homes and vehicles. Kenscoff commands the high ground over routes into Petion-Ville, the temporary seat of government and location of most diplomatic missions. UN figures record at least 613 killed and over 18,000 displaced in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac and Cite Soleil between 6 March and 31 July 2026, with roughly 1,408 killed nationwide in the second quarter.
- Trinidad and Tobago foreign minister opens energy and security track in Caracas HIGH Foreign and CARICOM Affairs Minister Sean Sobers arrived in Caracas on 3 September 2026 and met Venezuelan counterpart Felix Plasencia, agreeing a roadmap spanning trade, energy, agriculture, environment and collective security. The proximate objective is securing Venezuelan gas, principally from the Dragon field, to refill Trinidad's underutilised LNG and petrochemical capacity under the OFAC licence framework restored in October 2025. Port of Spain is simultaneously an Americas Counter Cartel Coalition signatory and a public supporter of US maritime strikes, making this the sharpest hedging exercise in the anglophone Caribbean.
- Forced returns to Haiti reach roughly 197,000 in first eight months of 2026 HIGH The Haitian Times reported on 5 September 2026 that approximately 197,000 Haitians were forcibly returned between January and August 2026, including 194,465 from the Dominican Republic, some 20,000 more than in the equivalent 2025 period. Haiti simultaneously hosts about 1.5 million internally displaced people, with 6.4 million requiring humanitarian assistance and 5.8 million in acute food insecurity. US removals resumed after the June Supreme Court ruling ending Temporary Protected Status for over 300,000 Haitians, with three flights since August and planning for up to two weekly.
- Cuba's grid failures and exhausted fuel reserves entrench a chronic instability risk HIGH Cuba experienced its sixth nationwide blackout of 2026 on 3 August, three of them in July alone, with thunderstorms disrupting restoration according to CNN and Al Jazeera reporting that day. The energy minister confirmed in May 2026 that Russian-supplied oil reserves had run out following the US oil blockade imposed in January, leaving domestic production covering only about 40 percent of national demand. Localised protests have occurred outside Havana and in central Cuba; a further sustained outage cycle into the autumn would materially raise the probability of a maritime exodus toward Florida and the Bahamas.
- Interdiction pressure displaces cocaine routes east toward Guyana and the Guianas ELEVATED InSight Crime assesses that sustained US strikes off Venezuela's northern coast have pushed trafficking networks eastward toward Guyana, Suriname and northern Brazil, where new deepwater port capacity and an oil-driven construction boom provide commercial cover. Cocaine consignments originating in Guyana were seized in Antwerp, over 1.8 tonnes, and Cartagena, 300 kilograms, in mid-February 2026. The EL PACCTO 2.0 and InSight Crime Southern Caribbean Corridor study launched in March 2026 with CARICOM IMPACS is the first multi-institution mapping of these routes, and points to risk transfer onto the region's least-resourced law enforcement institutions.
Regional Hotspots
Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, Haiti
Gang coalitions retain control of the large majority of the capital; UN figures record at least 613 killed and over 18,000 displaced in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac and Cite Soleil between 6 March and 31 July 2026. The Gang Suppression Force remains at roughly a fifth of authorised strength as its mandate approaches expiry on 30 September.
Kenscoff, Haiti
Viv Ansanm fighters overran the town centre on the night of 23 August 2026, killing at least 47 people including worshippers sheltering in a church. The commune commands the approaches to Petion-Ville, where the transitional government and most embassies are located.
Southern Caribbean strike operating area
The maritime box off Venezuela's northern coast where Joint Task Force Western Hemisphere resumed lethal vessel strikes on 23-25 August 2026 after a 63-day pause. Cumulative toll since September 2025 stands at roughly 227 killed in at least 68 strikes.
Cuyuni-Mazaruni border zone and Ankoko Island, Guyana-Venezuela
The focal point of Venezuela's Essequibo claim, where troop visibility and exercises have persisted despite Caracas's post-January 2026 political transition. The ICJ heard the merits on 4-11 May 2026 and a binding judgment on the 1899 Arbitral Award is expected within the year.
Havana and the Cuban national grid
Cuba suffered its sixth nationwide blackout of 2026 on 3 August with restoration disrupted by thunderstorms, following confirmation in May that Russian-supplied oil reserves had run out. Service collapse in water pumping and waste management is generating localised protest and migration pressure.
Dajabon-Ouanaminthe border crossing, Dominican Republic-Haiti
The principal conduit for the 194,465 Haitians deported from the Dominican Republic in the first eight months of 2026, at roughly a thousand removals a day. Reception, shelter and reintegration capacity on the Haitian side is minimal.
Gulf of Paria and Port of Spain, Trinidad & Tobago
Trinidad has operated under a state of emergency since 3 March 2026 while sitting adjacent to the US strike operating area and pursuing Venezuelan Dragon field gas via a 17km subsea tieback. Foreign Minister Sobers opened a bilateral security and energy track in Caracas on 3 September 2026.
Roosevelt Roads and Muniz ANG Base, Puerto Rico
The reactivated Ceiba naval facility and Muniz Air National Guard Base form the primary air bridge for US forces entering the theatre, hosting several thousand personnel. Concentration of enabling infrastructure makes the island the region's principal force-protection concern.
Thematic Intelligence
Sep 07, 2026
Military & Defense
HIGH
The Caribbean basin remains the most militarised it has been in decades, driven almost entirely by external rather than regional forces. US Operation Southern Spear continued leth…
The Caribbean basin remains the most militarised it has been in decades, driven almost entirely by external rather than regional forces. US Operation Southern Spear continued lethal maritime interdiction into the reporting window, with compiled tallies showing at least 68 strikes on 69 vessels and at least 227 people killed since the campaign opened in September 2025, including a Caribbean strike on 25 August 2026. Regional defence forces are meanwhile absorbed by the Haiti deployment, where the UN-authorised Gang Suppression Force remains roughly a fifth manned against its authorised ceiling. Caribbean states have almost no independent influence over the US campaign occurring in and adjacent to their exclusive economic zones, and the Dominican Republic remains the only regional state documented as an operational partner. The principal military risk this week is not interstate conflict but the unresolved legal and sovereignty exposure of small states hosting or bordering a sustained US kinetic operation.
- 25 August 2026: a US strike on a vessel in the Caribbean Sea killed four people, per the compiled O…
- Cumulative Southern Spear totals as of 25 August 2026 stand at at least 68 strikes on 69 vessels an…
- The operation draws on US Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard assets alongside the CIA, a…
- 25 August 2026: a US strike on a vessel in the Caribbean Sea killed four people, per the compiled Operation Southern Spear strike record; a 23 August 2026 Eastern Pacific strike killed two, confirming the campaign is now split across two basins.
- Cumulative Southern Spear totals as of 25 August 2026 stand at at least 68 strikes on 69 vessels and at least 227 people killed, including 17 missing and presumed dead, since operations began in September 2025.
- The operation draws on US Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard assets alongside the CIA, an unusually broad joint-agency posture for a counter-narcotics mission in the Caribbean basin.
- The Dominican Republic remains the only Caribbean state publicly documented as operationally cooperating with a US strike, having assisted in locating a vessel struck on 19 September 2025 and recovering 1,000 kg of cocaine afterwards.
- Haiti's Gang Suppression Force, authorised by UNSC Resolution 2793 on 30 September 2025 with a 5,550 personnel ceiling, began operations on 1 June 2026 but stood at only 1,083 military personnel and 16 civilian staff as of 8 July 2026.
- Jamaica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Chad have provided the bulk of GSF troop contributions to date, with full operational capacity not projected until the October-December 2026 window.
Outlook: Expect continued US strike tempo through Q4 2026 with no indication of drawdown, and mounting legal and parliamentary p…
Outlook: Expect continued US strike tempo through Q4 2026 with no indication of drawdown, and mounting legal and parliamentary pressure inside Caribbean states over acquiescence to operations in adjacent waters. GSF force generation is the variable to watch: if Security Council reauthorisation before 30 September 2026 is not paired with new troop pledges, the October-December full-capacity target slips and Haitian gang territorial control persists into the December election period.
Diplomatic & Political
ELEVATED
Caribbean diplomacy this week is dominated by a single hard deadline: the 30 September 2026 expiry of the Gang Suppression Force mandate, with the US and Panama as co-penholders e…
Caribbean diplomacy this week is dominated by a single hard deadline: the 30 September 2026 expiry of the Gang Suppression Force mandate, with the US and Panama as co-penholders expected to table reauthorisation. A CARICOM delegation was in Haiti from 2 to 9 September 2026 assessing whether the transition can credibly deliver elections on 13 December 2026, the first presidential and legislative polls since 2016. Haitian Foreign Minister Raina Forbin used the first week of September to make a public appeal for renewal, framed around technical, financial, logistical and safety support. CARICOM's own agenda is otherwise procedurally normal, with the Secretary-General engaging the OAS Permanent Council and preparations advancing for the reparations conference in Barbados. The gap between the Community's declaratory diplomacy on Haiti and its limited material leverage over the outcome remains the structural weakness.
- 2-9 September 2026: a CARICOM delegation deployed to Haiti to assess the political and security sit…
- 4 September 2026: Haitian Foreign Minister Raina Forbin publicly called for renewal of the Gang Sup…
- 3 September 2026: CARICOM Secretary-General Dr Carla Barnett addressed a regular meeting of the OAS…
- 2-9 September 2026: a CARICOM delegation deployed to Haiti to assess the political and security situation and meet government, political and civil society actors ahead of scheduled elections.
- 4 September 2026: Haitian Foreign Minister Raina Forbin publicly called for renewal of the Gang Suppression Force ahead of its 30 September 2026 mandate expiry, citing needs for technical, financial, logistical and safety support.
- 3 September 2026: CARICOM Secretary-General Dr Carla Barnett addressed a regular meeting of the OAS Permanent Council, the Community's principal hemispheric engagement of the week.
- Haiti's Provisional Electoral Council has set presidential and legislative elections for 13 December 2026 with a possible second round on 21 February 2027, but roughly one million identity cards still need to be issued for voters.
- 2 September 2026: the CARICOM Reparations Commission announced its Third Regional Conference on Reparations for 17-19 September 2026 in Barbados under the theme 'Reparatory Justice as the Coming Enlightenment'.
- Institutional scaffolding for Haiti is in place: BINUH's mandate was renewed in January 2026 through 31 January 2027 and the UN Support Office in Haiti became fully operational on 1 April 2026.
Outlook: Reauthorisation of the GSF before 30 September 2026 is the near-certain baseline given US and Panamanian sponsorship, b…
Outlook: Reauthorisation of the GSF before 30 September 2026 is the near-certain baseline given US and Panamanian sponsorship, but the operative question is whether the resolution carries new force-generation or funding mechanisms rather than a rollover. Watch the CARICOM delegation's post-mission communique after 9 September for the Community's judgement on election feasibility; an explicitly pessimistic assessment would be the strongest signal yet that the 13 December timetable slips.
Economic & Trade
MODERATE
The regional economy is running two divergent tracks. Tourism-dependent islands posted a record first quarter of 2026 with roughly 10 million stay-over arrivals, up 3.9 percent ye…
The regional economy is running two divergent tracks. Tourism-dependent islands posted a record first quarter of 2026 with roughly 10 million stay-over arrivals, up 3.9 percent year-on-year, while the Guyana-Suriname hydrocarbon basin continued its buildout with Stabroek output near 900,000 barrels per day and Suriname's GranMorgu moving through execution toward 2028 first oil. Against that, sovereign debt in Jamaica, Barbados and several OECS members leaves negligible fiscal room for storm reconstruction, and Cuba's energy and fuel crisis has become a structural economic emergency rather than a cyclical shock. Trinidad and Tobago's gas monetisation still hinges on unresolved access to Venezuela's Dragon field. Nothing in the reporting window materially changed these trajectories, which is why the theme scores below the security files despite its long-run importance.
- Q1 2026 delivered a record 10 million stay-over arrivals region-wide, a 3.9 percent year-on-year in…
- Jamaica generated US$956 million in tourism foreign-exchange earnings in Q1 2026 while carrying pub…
- ExxonMobil and Stabroek co-venturers Hess and CNOOC reached 900,000 barrels per day in Guyana, with…
- Q1 2026 delivered a record 10 million stay-over arrivals region-wide, a 3.9 percent year-on-year increase, against 35 million arrivals in full-year 2025 that sat 9.6 percent above pre-pandemic 2019 levels.
- Jamaica generated US$956 million in tourism foreign-exchange earnings in Q1 2026 while carrying public debt around 72 percent of GDP, illustrating the region's revenue-versus-fiscal-space squeeze.
- ExxonMobil and Stabroek co-venturers Hess and CNOOC reached 900,000 barrels per day in Guyana, with total capacity of 1.7 million bopd targeted across eight developments once approved.
- Suriname's US$10.5 billion GranMorgu project advanced in July 2026 with a Halliburton integrated drilling and completion award; PETRONAS announced the Sloanea-2 gas discovery in Block 52 in June 2026 and Staatsolie opened more than 70,000 sq km of offshore acreage under an open-door licensing round.
- Cuba suffered its third nationwide blackout of 2026 on 6 July, the eighth since late 2024, with the grid able to serve only 1 percent of Havana demand at the low point and only one Russian tanker permitted to discharge since January 2026.
- Trinidad and Tobago's access to Venezuelan Dragon field gas for Atlantic LNG feedstock remained unresolved through 2026, with OFAC licensing permitting negotiations with PDVSA only through April 2026.
Outlook: Tourism should close 2026 within the CTO's 3-4 percent stay-over and 5-7 percent cruise growth bands, keeping foreign-e…
Outlook: Tourism should close 2026 within the CTO's 3-4 percent stay-over and 5-7 percent cruise growth bands, keeping foreign-exchange inflows solid but not solving debt stock problems. The decisive variables for 2027 are whether Trinidad secures a durable Dragon arrangement under post-Maduro Venezuelan authorities, whether Guyana's spending absorbs its production ramp without Dutch-disease distortion, and whether Cuba's grid stabilises enough to prevent a further step-change in outward migration.
Cyber & Technology
LOW
This was a genuinely quiet reporting week for Caribbean cyber. No new compromise of a regional government or critical-infrastructure operator was publicly reported between 28 Augu…
This was a genuinely quiet reporting week for Caribbean cyber. No new compromise of a regional government or critical-infrastructure operator was publicly reported between 28 August and 7 September 2026, and the region did not feature in global incident round-ups covering the period. The substantive activity is institutional rather than incident-driven, centred on EU-funded implementation of the CARICOM Cybercrime and Cybersecurity Action Plan and capability building through the LAC4 centre in Santo Domingo. That quiet should not be read as resilience: baseline maturity across the region remains among the weakest in the hemisphere, with most Caribbean states at the bottom two tiers of the ITU Global Cybersecurity Index. The theme is scored low this week on observed activity, not on structural exposure.
- No publicly reported compromise of a Caribbean government ministry, utility or major financial inst…
- The CARICOM Cybercrime and Cybersecurity Action Plan, launched 31 October 2025 in Port of Spain, re…
- EU support is delivered through Global Gateway and the EU-LAC Digital Alliance, implemented by Expe…
- No publicly reported compromise of a Caribbean government ministry, utility or major financial institution surfaced in the 28 August to 7 September 2026 window; regional cyber reporting was dominated by capacity-building rather than incidents.
- The CARICOM Cybercrime and Cybersecurity Action Plan, launched 31 October 2025 in Port of Spain, remains the central regional framework, built on six pillars covering awareness, capability, technical standards, regulation, incident management and cooperation.
- EU support is delivered through Global Gateway and the EU-LAC Digital Alliance, implemented by Expertise France and EL PACCTO 2.0, with training run from the LAC4 Latin America and Caribbean Cyber Competence Centre in Santo Domingo.
- On the ITU Global Cybersecurity Index only Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago reach Tier 3, with all remaining Caribbean states at Tiers 4-5 against a regional average score of 10.2 out of 20.
- The closest recent regional precedent is the 22 June 2026 hijack of Brazil's Defesa Civil Alerta emergency alert platform, which pushed false extreme-weather warnings to thousands of handsets before the system was disabled; attribution remains unknown and no Caribbean linkage has been established.
- The most recent confirmed Caribbean government compromise remains the August 2025 ransomware attack on Curacao's Tax and Customs Administration, part of a cluster affecting Dutch Kingdom Caribbean territories.
Outlook: Expect the quiet to break rather than persist. Ransomware operators have repeatedly targeted small Caribbean tax, custo…
Outlook: Expect the quiet to break rather than persist. Ransomware operators have repeatedly targeted small Caribbean tax, customs and health ministries where recovery capacity is thin, and the December Haitian electoral cycle plus the Q4 tourism peak both raise the value of disruptive operations. The near-term indicator to monitor is CCSCAP national implementation milestones and any incident-response drill outcomes published through LAC4.
Maritime & Territorial
ELEVATED
The maritime picture is defined by a lethal US interdiction campaign, an unresolved sovereignty case at the International Court of Justice, and a benign weather baseline. Guyana's…
The maritime picture is defined by a lethal US interdiction campaign, an unresolved sovereignty case at the International Court of Justice, and a benign weather baseline. Guyana's case against Venezuela over Essequibo has completed written pleadings following Venezuela's rejoinder, with oral hearings anticipated and Caracas having signalled it would disregard an adverse ruling. Interdiction pressure in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific is displacing trafficking eastward, with Guyana's new port infrastructure and rapid growth making it an increasingly attractive transit node. Meanwhile the Atlantic basin is unusually calm at the climatological peak of hurricane season, removing the disruption factor that normally dominates September maritime risk. The net effect is a theme driven by legal and criminal dynamics rather than by weather.
- Venezuela filed its rejoinder in Guyana v. Venezuela at the ICJ on 11 August 2025, closing written …
- Venezuela's Executive Vice President has stated the country would ignore a final ICJ ruling on Esse…
- InSight Crime assesses that US strikes are displacing cocaine flows eastward toward Guyana, citing …
- Venezuela filed its rejoinder in Guyana v. Venezuela at the ICJ on 11 August 2025, closing written pleadings in the case Guyana filed on 29 March 2019, with oral hearings anticipated in the coming period.
- Venezuela's Executive Vice President has stated the country would ignore a final ICJ ruling on Essequibo, while Guyana has committed to accepting the verdict, setting up a compliance crisis regardless of outcome.
- InSight Crime assesses that US strikes are displacing cocaine flows eastward toward Guyana, citing an increase in unregistered flights transiting the country since the strikes began and the attractiveness of its new deepwater port capacity.
- US Coast Guard maritime cocaine seizures reached a service record of approximately 231,000 kg in fiscal year 2025 as traffickers adjusted to Pacific and Central American interdiction pressure.
- A Southern Caribbean Corridor study on transnational organised crime, led by the EU-funded EL PACCTO 2.0 with InSight Crime and inputs from CARICOM IMPACS, was launched on 20 March 2026 mapping the marina-to-container-terminal pipeline into Europe.
- NOAA maintained its below-normal 2026 Atlantic hurricane season outlook at 7-13 named storms, 2-6 hurricanes and 0-2 major hurricanes, and Saharan dust plus high Caribbean wind shear left no development expected in the seven days from early September 2026.
Outlook: The dominant medium-term risk is an ICJ merits ruling that Caracas rejects, which would convert a legal dispute into a …
Outlook: The dominant medium-term risk is an ICJ merits ruling that Caracas rejects, which would convert a legal dispute into a standing sovereignty confrontation on Guyana's western border just as production approaches 1 million bpd. Near term, expect further eastward displacement of trafficking toward Guyana, Suriname and the southern Windwards, and treat the current tropical quiet as a temporary reprieve rather than a season-ending signal given remaining weeks of climatological exposure.
EU Cooperation & Investment Portfolio 55 projects · EUR 9,797M · trade agreements in EU Global
★
EU
EU Cooperation & Investment Portfolio
Caribbean — Active programmes, partnerships & trade agreements
EUR 9,797M
Total Investment
55
Projects & Programmes
33
Countries Covered
46
Active
Top Sectors by Investment
Energy & Green Transition
3
EUR 6,997M
Infrastructure & Transport
6
EUR 1,037M
Development Cooperation
5
EUR 360M
Humanitarian
4
EUR 340M
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3
EUR 215M
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Haiti — MIP 2021-2027
Active (46)
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