The Essentials
Intel as of Sep 13, 2026
- UN Security Council Vote on Haiti Gang Suppression Force Mandate Set for 30 September — The Gang Suppression Force (GSF), authorized in September 2025 to replace the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support mission, faces a mandate expir…
- Operation Southern Spear Strikes Continue; Cumulative Death Toll Passes 227 — On 9 September US Southern Command, through the newly activated Joint Task Force Western Hemisphere, executed a lethal kinetic strike on a go-fast ve…
- Cuba Energy Collapse Drives Record Protest Wave Amid US Fuel Blockade — Cuba's national grid has suffered repeated island-wide collapses during 2026, including a nationwide failure reported on 3 August, with roughly half …
Threat level changes vs Sep 07
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Trinidad and Tobago
HIGH
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Curacao
MODERATE
▼
Aruba
MODERATE
from ELEVATED
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Turks and Caicos Islands
MODERATE
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Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
LOW
Latest
Threat Intensity
Critical High Elevated Low
Critical High Elevated Low
Country Threat Matrix
| Level | Assessment | |
|---|---|---|
Haiti
|
CRITICAL | Gangs control approximately 85 percent of metropolitan Port-au-Prince and have expanded into five of ten departments; over 2,000 killed and nearly 1.5 million displaced in 2026; elections postponed to 13 December; GSF mandate expires 30 September. |
Cuba
|
HIGH | Repeated national grid collapses, exhausted diesel and fuel oil stocks, 20-22 hour Havana outages, record protest volume of 1,415 incidents in July 2026, and escalating US sanctions plus explicit regime-change speculation. |
Trinidad and Tobago
|
HIGH | State of Public Emergency declared 3 March 2026 over gang violence and intelligence of planned attacks on security personnel; roughly 10 of the last 14 months under emergency rule; front-line exposure to US-Venezuela confrontation and suspended Venezuelan energy deals. |
Guyana
|
ELEVATED | Essequibo dispute remains unresolved at the ICJ amid Venezuelan troop visibility and naval posturing near the border; rapid offshore oil expansion raises strategic stakes; eastward displacement of cocaine routes increases transit exposure. |
Dominican Republic
|
ELEVATED | Absorbing spillover from Haitian state collapse while executing roughly 1,000 deportations daily; border smuggling economy and official corruption persist; identified as a principal Caribbean cocaine transshipment hub. |
Puerto Rico
|
ELEVATED | Now a central node of the US Caribbean buildup with Roosevelt Roads reactivated, F-35 deployments, radar installations and expanded funding at Fort Buchanan, Ramey and Camp Santiago; low internal violence but high strategic targeting profile and domestic political friction. |
Bahamas
|
MODERATE | Sustained maritime migration pressure with roughly 1,075 migrants interdicted aboard eight vessels in 2026 and combined migrant-narcotics interceptions such as the Exumas case; stable governance and functioning institutions. |
Jamaica
|
MODERATE | Serious crime down 19.5 percent and murders down 22.5 percent in the first half of 2026 following a 31-year low in 2025; residual vulnerability concentrated in incomplete Hurricane Melissa recovery in western parishes. |
Suriname
|
MODERATE | Pre-production hydrocarbon build-out around the US$10.5 billion GranMorgu project with first oil targeted for mid-2028; rising exposure as traffickers shift routes east toward the Guianas, but no active internal security crisis. |
| Curacao Curacao | MODERATE | Hosts a US forward operating location 40 miles from the Venezuelan coast under a treaty limited to unarmed surveillance flights; placed on alert following the January 2026 US operation in Venezuela. |
| Aruba Aruba | MODERATE | Second Dutch Caribbean forward operating location supporting counter-narcotics aviation; proximity to the Venezuelan coast creates spillover and contingency risk despite stable domestic conditions. |
| Turks and Caicos Islands Turks and Caicos Islands | MODERATE | Recurrent interdiction of overloaded Haitian migrant vessels alongside Bahamian waters; limited maritime enforcement capacity relative to flow volume, but no internal instability. |
Barbados
|
LOW | Stable democratic governance and functioning institutions; principal exposure is diplomatic, as a leading voice in the CARICOM zone-of-peace majority resisting US military action. |
Saint Lucia
|
LOW | No active security emergency; modest transit exposure within the Southern Caribbean corridor and economic sensitivity to the below-normal but non-zero hurricane season. |
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
|
LOW | Stable internal conditions; participated in the March 2026 Southern Caribbean Corridor transnational organised crime study, indicating recognised but managed trafficking exposure. |
Caribbean Market Indicators
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Key Developments
- UN Security Council Vote on Haiti Gang Suppression Force Mandate Set for 30 September CRITICAL The Gang Suppression Force (GSF), authorized in September 2025 to replace the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support mission, faces a mandate expiry on 30 September 2026, with the United States and Panama acting as co-penholders on a re-authorization text. On 4 September the Haitian government formally called for renewal of the international anti-gang task force, and the GSF has requested an extension through September 2028 alongside its first detailed operational roadmap. The force remains short of full operational capacity, which commanders now project between October and end-2026, and achieved its first major deployment outside Port-au-Prince only on 12 August when Sri Lankan personnel moved into the Artibonite department. Gangs still control roughly 85 percent of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and have expanded into at least five of Haiti's ten departments, with more than 2,000 killed and nearly 1.5 million displaced since January 2026. A lapsed or under-resourced mandate would remove the only external counter-gang instrument at precisely the moment Haiti attempts an electoral process.
- Operation Southern Spear Strikes Continue; Cumulative Death Toll Passes 227 CRITICAL On 9 September US Southern Command, through the newly activated Joint Task Force Western Hemisphere, executed a lethal kinetic strike on a go-fast vessel on a Caribbean narco-trafficking route, killing three. The Intercept reported on 2 September that the year-long campaign had killed 227 people, and open-source tallies place the operation at no fewer than 68 strikes since it began in September 2025. The Associated Press and NBC News have noted that no definitive public evidence has been released demonstrating that any struck vessel carried narcotics, and Colombian and Venezuelan officials maintain some of the dead were fishermen rather than traffickers. CARICOM governments were conspicuously silent following the latest strike, underscoring the political cost of dissent for states dependent on US security and economic cooperation. The campaign has become the defining feature of the Caribbean maritime security environment and a persistent irritant in hemispheric legal and diplomatic fora.
- Cuba Energy Collapse Drives Record Protest Wave Amid US Fuel Blockade CRITICAL Cuba's national grid has suffered repeated island-wide collapses during 2026, including a nationwide failure reported on 3 August, with roughly half the country still without power during the most recent restoration cycle at approximately 45 percent service nationally. The crisis stems from the US fuel blockade imposed in January 2026 following the Venezuela intervention, compounded by a 29 January executive order imposing tariffs on states exporting oil to Cuba and a 1 May executive order sanctioning officials for repression and national-security threats. Havana districts have experienced 20 to 22 hour daily outages and some rural communities have endured interruptions exceeding 70 hours, with the energy minister acknowledging the island had exhausted diesel and fuel oil stocks. The Cuban Conflict Observatory recorded 1,415 protests and critical expressions in July 2026, a modern record, and more than 150 protests have occurred in the current month. President Diaz-Canel has framed the sanctions as a 'ferocious war' and characterized demonstrators as US-financed criminals, signaling a repression-first posture rather than accommodation.
- Haiti Postpones First-Round Elections to 13 December as Security Conditions Fail HIGH Haiti's Provisional Electoral Council announced on 27 July that presidential and legislative elections set for 30 August had been postponed to 13 December, with a second round scheduled for 21 February 2027 and final results due 12 March. Acting Interim Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aime suspended the August vote on the explicit grounds that 'the security conditions are not met,' following a renewed surge in gang offensives. The CEP conditioned adherence to the revised calendar on an acceptable security threshold and the availability of financing, neither of which is currently assured in a country that has not voted in a decade. Political fragility has compounded the problem, with the transitional presidential council having moved to dismiss Fils-Aime shortly before the panel's own scheduled expiry. Electoral logistics in gang-held territory covering most of the capital remain the central unresolved obstacle.
- Dominican Republic Deportations of Haitians Hit Record Operational Tempo HIGH Dominican authorities deported 250,429 Haitian nationals between January and July 2026, a 16.2 percent increase over the 215,463 removed in the same period of 2025, sustaining a pace of roughly 1,000 removals per day under the mass-deportation drive President Abinader launched in October 2024. August alone produced 35,276 Haitian deportations, the highest single-month total of the year, at a reported programme cost of RD$5 billion. Haitian rights organisation GARR has documented that pregnant women, nursing mothers and unaccompanied minors constituted a meaningful share of removals, drawing accusations of racial profiling and statelessness. Foreign Minister Roberto Alvarez has himself described the border as a 'revolving door,' with smuggling networks and complicit officials facilitating rapid re-entry of deportees for substantial fees. The policy generates sustained bilateral friction while producing negligible durable reduction in irregular presence.
- CARICOM Unity Fractures Over Zone-of-Peace Doctrine and US Security Alignment HIGH The removal of Nicolas Maduro on 3 January 2026 and the ongoing US strike campaign have split CARICOM between a majority defending the Caribbean 'zone of peace' declaration and states aligning with Washington. Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago are the only CARICOM members participating in the Shield of the Americas, a US-led security framework launched at a March 2026 Miami summit, and in May both declined to sign a CARICOM statement opposing US military pressure on Cuba. Trinidad and Tobago under Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar has opened airports to US military access, hosted a destroyer visit and conducted joint Marine Corps exercises, prompting Caracas to suspend energy agreements with Port of Spain. Caribbean civil-society actors renewed zone-of-peace demands in late August 2026, indicating the dispute remains live rather than settled. The bloc's inability to formulate a common position materially weakens its collective diplomatic leverage on migration, sanctions and maritime enforcement.
- Quiet Hurricane Peak Offers Recovery Window as Jamaica Consolidates Security Gains MODERATE As of the second week of September 2026 no active tropical cyclones existed anywhere in the Atlantic basin, an unusual condition at the climatological peak, with the season having produced only Tropical Storms Arthur and Bertha and no hurricanes to date. NOAA maintained a below-normal forecast of 7 to 13 named storms, 2 to 6 hurricanes and 0 to 2 major hurricanes, attributing suppression to a strengthening El Nino and record July-onward Caribbean wind shear. The lull is operationally significant for Jamaica, which is still absorbing over US$12 billion in losses and 45 deaths from Category 5 Hurricane Melissa in late October 2025, with Black River and parts of Montego Bay facing intermittent utility disruption and degraded hospital capacity. Concurrently Jamaica has posted genuine security improvement, with serious crime down 19.5 percent in the first half of 2026, murders down 22.5 percent and January 2026 producing the lowest monthly homicide total since records began in 2001. Jamaican authorities have nonetheless warned against complacency, noting that a quiet season does not reduce underlying structural exposure.
Regional Hotspots
Port-au-Prince Metropolitan Area
Armed gangs hold roughly 85 percent of the metropolitan area, with kidnapping, sexual violence and territorial clashes in Cite Soleil and Arcahaie. More than 2,000 killed and nearly 1.5 million displaced nationally in 2026, and 6.4 million people, over half the population, require humanitarian assistance. The GSF has yet to reach full operational capacity and its mandate expires 30 September.
Southern Caribbean Maritime Strike Zone
Waters between Venezuela, Trinidad and the Windward Passage approaches are the operating area for Operation Southern Spear, with at least 68 strikes and 227 deaths since September 2025, including a 9 September strike killing three. Joint Task Force Western Hemisphere, activated in August, now directs operations. Trinidad has granted airport access and hosted joint Marine Corps exercises, drawing Venezuelan protest.
Havana and Cuban National Grid
Repeated island-wide grid collapses through 2026, including the 3 August failure, have left roughly half the country without power at times, with 20 to 22 hour daily outages in Havana districts. More than 150 protests have occurred this month against a July record of 1,415 documented protest events. The January 2026 US fuel blockade and subsequent executive orders have removed the import cushion.
Artibonite and Kenscoff Gang Expansion Front
Gang expansion beyond the capital into the Artibonite and Centre departments and the Kenscoff highlands marks the widening of the conflict, with attacks on the farming community of Kenscoff displacing over 2,600 people in September 2026. The GSF conducted its first deployment outside Port-au-Prince on 12 August, sending Sri Lankan personnel into Artibonite. Control of this corridor determines whether December elections are logistically feasible.
Dominican-Haitian Border (Dajabon Corridor)
The principal crossing point for a deportation programme that removed 250,429 Haitians between January and July 2026 and 35,276 in August alone. Smuggling networks and complicit officials operate a re-entry economy that Dominican Foreign Minister Alvarez has called a revolving door. Humanitarian concerns centre on removals of pregnant women, nursing mothers and unaccompanied minors.
Roosevelt Roads / Ceiba, Puerto Rico
The naval station closed in 2004 has been reactivated and is one of five sites where US forces now operate in Puerto Rico, supported by runway expansion, radar installation and a nearly US$41 million fuel support contract at Jose Aponte de la Torre Airport. F-35 aircraft have deployed to the island for counter-narcotics operations. The buildup has reopened longstanding domestic political grievances over militarisation.
Essequibo Frontier, Guyana-Venezuela
Venezuela has increased troop visibility near the border and stationed naval vessels, including Iranian-supplied Zolfaghar missile boats, at the port nearest Guyana. Offshore hydrocarbon extraction has converted a dormant territorial claim into an active energy-security confrontation now monitored by the ICJ. Post-Maduro political uncertainty in Caracas makes escalation calculus harder to read.
Curacao-Aruba Forward Operating Locations
Two US forward operating locations established under 2000 and 2001 treaties sit 40 to 50 miles off the Venezuelan coast, restricted by treaty to unarmed surveillance and detection flights. The Dutch government stated the islands were carefully informed following the January 2026 US operation in Venezuela, and both were placed on alert. Activity levels remain within treaty parameters, keeping escalation risk contained for now.
Thematic Intelligence
Sep 13, 2026
Military & Defense
HIGH
The Caribbean basin remains the most militarised it has been since the Cold War, with the US maritime strike campaign passing its one-year mark on 1 September 2026 and continuing …
The Caribbean basin remains the most militarised it has been since the Cold War, with the US maritime strike campaign passing its one-year mark on 1 September 2026 and continuing without pause. Command architecture has been formalised rather than wound down: SOUTHCOM stood up Joint Task Force Western Hemisphere in August 2026 as a permanent successor to Joint Task Force Southern Spear, and operations have begun expanding from go-fast vessel strikes to trafficking logistics and shore infrastructure. In Haiti, the parallel military line of effort is badly under-resourced, with the UN-authorised Gang Suppression Force fielding roughly a fifth of its authorised strength. The principal near-term military variable is no longer Venezuelan state resistance, which collapsed after the January 2026 intervention, but the sustainability and legality of an open-ended lethal interdiction campaign in international waters.
- 9 Sep 2026: US Southern Command announced that Joint Task Force Western Hemisphere executed a 'leth…
- 1 Sep 2026 marked one year of the US maritime strike campaign begun in September 2025; Reuters tall…
- August 2026: SOUTHCOM activated Joint Task Force Western Hemisphere (JTF-WHEM) as a permanent, purp…
- 9 Sep 2026: US Southern Command announced that Joint Task Force Western Hemisphere executed a 'lethal kinetic strike' on a go-fast vessel transiting established narco-trafficking routes in the Caribbean, killing three people SOUTHCOM described as narco-terrorists; no US personnel were injured.
- 1 Sep 2026 marked one year of the US maritime strike campaign begun in September 2025; Reuters tallies more than 220 people killed to date, while Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and independent UN experts characterise the strikes as unlawful extrajudicial killings.
- August 2026: SOUTHCOM activated Joint Task Force Western Hemisphere (JTF-WHEM) as a permanent, purpose-built joint command succeeding Joint Task Force Southern Spear, integrating Latin American members of the 'Americas Counter Cartel Coalition' under a standing counter-narcoterrorism mission.
- 5 Sep 2026: JTF-WHEM forces interdicted a multi-vessel floating refuelling station supporting at-sea drug trafficking in the Eastern Pacific, evidence the campaign is broadening from individual vessel strikes toward trafficking logistics nodes.
- Haiti: at the UN Security Council's 20 July 2026 briefing (10198th meeting), only about 1,000 of the 5,550 authorised Gang Suppression Force personnel had deployed, with Kenya the main contributor; the force has established one forward operating base and continuous patrols in Port-au-Prince.
- Congressional oversight friction persists: the December 2025 NDAA threatened to withhold a quarter of the Defense Secretary's travel budget until unedited video of the 2 September 2025 'double-tap' strike — which killed survivors of an initial attack — and the authorising orders were provided to the armed services committees.
Outlook: Expect the strike tempo to continue at roughly weekly intervals through Q4 2026, with incremental escalation toward sho…
Outlook: Expect the strike tempo to continue at roughly weekly intervals through Q4 2026, with incremental escalation toward shore-based cartel infrastructure rather than de-escalation. The decisive military question for the region is Haiti: without rapid force generation beyond the current ~1,000 personnel, the Gang Suppression Force cannot secure a December election, and a lapse or under-funded renewal of its mandate would leave a security vacuum that no regional actor is positioned to fill.
Diplomatic & Political
HIGH
Caribbean diplomacy in September 2026 is dominated by a hard deadline: the Gang Suppression Force mandate for Haiti expires on 30 September, three weeks before the campaign period…
Caribbean diplomacy in September 2026 is dominated by a hard deadline: the Gang Suppression Force mandate for Haiti expires on 30 September, three weeks before the campaign period for Haiti's first elections in a decade is due to begin. Port-au-Prince has formally petitioned the Security Council for renewal, but the force's chronic under-deployment and the abstentions of China, Russia and Pakistan on the original authorisation make a clean rollover uncertain. Separately, CARICOM cohesion is under visible strain, with Trinidad and Tobago openly endorsing US lethal strikes while other regional and Latin American governments condemn them. Venezuela's unresolved post-Maduro transition, still without an announced election date eight months after the January intervention, remains the region's largest open political variable.
- 4 Sep 2026: Haitian Foreign Minister Raina Forbin formally called on the UN Security Council, at an…
- 30 Sep 2026: the Security Council is scheduled to vote on GSF renewal; the force was created in Oct…
- Haiti's electoral council has set first-round presidential and legislative elections for 13 Decembe…
- 4 Sep 2026: Haitian Foreign Minister Raina Forbin formally called on the UN Security Council, at an Organization of American States meeting, to renew the Gang Suppression Force mandate, which expires 30 September 2026, and urged full deployment of the authorised 5,550 personnel.
- 30 Sep 2026: the Security Council is scheduled to vote on GSF renewal; the force was created in October 2025 on a US- and Panama-drafted resolution adopted 12-0-3, with China, Russia and Pakistan abstaining, and is headed by Special Representative Jack Christofides, whose first contingent (from Chad) arrived on 1 April 2026.
- Haiti's electoral council has set first-round presidential and legislative elections for 13 December 2026 with a 21 February 2027 runoff; candidate registration ran 20 August to 2 October 2026 and campaigning is due to start 5 October, yet voter registration still excludes the West Department containing gang-controlled Port-au-Prince.
- Haiti's political conditions continue to deteriorate: roughly 1,408 people were killed and 656 injured between April and June 2026 alone, over one million remain displaced, and nearly 200,000 Haitians were forcibly returned to the country in the first eight months of 2026 — 20,000 more than the same period in 2025.
- Regional alignment on the US campaign is split: Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar met Secretary of State Marco Rubio at a CARICOM conference in February 2026 and SOUTHCOM commander Gen. Francis L. Donovan in March 2026, publicly crediting US operations with cutting trafficking into Trinidad, while Colombian President Gustavo Petro has repeatedly denounced the same strikes as war crimes.
- Venezuela's transition remains unresolved: Delcy Rodríguez continues as acting president following the 3 January 2026 US airstrikes and capture of Nicolás Maduro, no elections have been scheduled, and the 24 June 2026 earthquakes that killed more than 6,100 further set back US-backed stabilisation phases.
Outlook: The 30 September Security Council vote is the single highest-consequence diplomatic event on the Caribbean calendar thi…
Outlook: The 30 September Security Council vote is the single highest-consequence diplomatic event on the Caribbean calendar this quarter; renewal is more likely than not, but a technical rollover without new troop pledges or funding would be a political fig leaf. Expect CARICOM to continue managing its internal split on the US strike campaign through silence rather than a common position, and expect Haiti's December election timetable to slip or be partially executed if GSF strength does not rise materially by October.
Economic & Trade
ELEVATED
Caribbean economic fundamentals are currently the region's brightest indicator, with tourism at record levels and Guyanese oil output approaching a national milestone. Q1 2026 arr…
Caribbean economic fundamentals are currently the region's brightest indicator, with tourism at record levels and Guyanese oil output approaching a national milestone. Q1 2026 arrivals reached about 10 million stay-over visitors and full-year growth of 3-4% is forecast, while Guyana is on track to cross one million barrels per day by year-end. The offsetting vulnerabilities are structural rather than cyclical: high public debt in Jamaica and Barbados constrains post-disaster reconstruction, roughly 62% of stay-over arrivals originate in a single source market, and Trinidad's gas future remains hostage to US sanctions licensing on the cross-border Dragon field. The net picture is growth with concentrated, well-understood downside risk rather than acute distress.
- 5 Sep 2026 analysis: the Caribbean recorded roughly 10 million stay-over arrivals in Q1 2026, up 3.…
- Jamaica welcomed about 1 million stopover visitors in Q1 2026 generating US$956 million in foreign …
- 16 Jan 2026: the IMF Executive Board approved a US$415 million Rapid Financing Instrument disbursem…
- 5 Sep 2026 analysis: the Caribbean recorded roughly 10 million stay-over arrivals in Q1 2026, up 3.9% year-on-year, following 35 million arrivals in full-year 2025 — 9.6% above 2019 pre-pandemic levels — with 3-4% regional growth projected for 2026.
- Jamaica welcomed about 1 million stopover visitors in Q1 2026 generating US$956 million in foreign exchange, a substantive rebound given Hurricane Melissa's October 2025 destruction of tourism infrastructure.
- 16 Jan 2026: the IMF Executive Board approved a US$415 million Rapid Financing Instrument disbursement to Jamaica under its large natural disaster window, lifting total available resources to US$1.077 billion; CAPRI puts Melissa's full fiscal cost at J$198 billion (~US$1.27 billion) and Fitch expects Jamaican debt near 68% of GDP by end-2026.
- Guyana's Stabroek block passed 900,000 bpd (milestone announced November 2025); the Errea Wittu FPSO for the Uaru development is designed to add ~250,000 bpd with first oil targeted for Q4 2026, which would push national output past 1 million bpd, against an operator target of 1.7 million bpd from eight developments by 2030 (ExxonMobil 45%, Hess 30%, CNOOC 25%).
- 14 Jun 2026: Guyana's Environmental Protection Agency opened a 28-day public consultation on ExxonMobil's application to drill up to 35 exploration and appraisal wells in Stabroek between 2028 and 2033 — the first time regulators have required a cumulative rather than project-by-project impact assessment.
- Trinidad and Tobago's gas-based economy still hinges on the 4+ Tcf Dragon field: OFAC's October 2025 three-stage licence permitted NGC and Shell to negotiate with PDVSA only through April 2026 and mandates US-company participation in development, and Caracas suspended the accord on 28 October 2025 over a US warship call at Port of Spain, with terms still being renegotiated as of May 2026.
Outlook: Barring a late-season storm, 2026 should close as a record tourism year and Guyana should cross one million bpd, giving…
Outlook: Barring a late-season storm, 2026 should close as a record tourism year and Guyana should cross one million bpd, giving the region headline growth well above the global average. The watch items are fiscal rather than demand-side: Jamaica's reconstruction borrowing against a ~68% debt-to-GDP ceiling, and whether the Dragon licence framework survives Venezuela's transition intact — failure there would leave Trinidad's LNG trains structurally under-fed into 2027.
Cyber & Technology
MODERATE
Caribbean cyber activity over the reporting window has been notably low-intensity, with no confirmed major breach of a regional government or critical operator. The most significa…
Caribbean cyber activity over the reporting window has been notably low-intensity, with no confirmed major breach of a regional government or critical operator. The most significant item — the University of the West Indies investigating ransomware claims on 23 August — remained unconfirmed at time of reporting, and the dominant story is institution-building rather than incident response. Antigua and Barbuda stood up a national incident response team on 1 September, Haiti opened its first cybersecurity research laboratory, and CARICOM ministers are pressing for a common AI governance framework. The genuine risk is latent and structural: Latin America and the Caribbean remain the world's least-protected region by cyber maturity score, so a quiet fortnight reflects low adversary attention rather than improved defensive posture.
- 23 Aug 2026: the University of the West Indies confirmed it was investigating claims of a ransomwar…
- 1 Sep 2026: the Government of Antigua and Barbuda launched a dedicated national cyber incident resp…
- 3 Sep 2026: Trinidad and Tobago ICT Minister Wheatley called for a unified CARICOM approach to arti…
- 23 Aug 2026: the University of the West Indies confirmed it was investigating claims of a ransomware compromise of its systems; as of reporting there was no confirmed evidence of system or data compromise.
- 1 Sep 2026: the Government of Antigua and Barbuda launched a dedicated national cyber incident response team to improve its ability to prepare for, detect and respond to cybersecurity threats.
- 3 Sep 2026: Trinidad and Tobago ICT Minister Wheatley called for a unified CARICOM approach to artificial intelligence governance; separately, the T&T Judiciary's AI Practice Direction took effect in July 2026, one of the region's first binding AI rules in a justice system.
- 3 Sep 2026: several unregistered drones were discovered in vehicles near Guyanese President Irfaan Ali's private residence at Leonora, West Coast Demerara, prompting a Guyana Civil Aviation Authority investigation — a counter-UAS and executive-protection gap with direct physical-layer security implications.
- 18 Aug 2026: the University of Technology of Haiti established the country's first cybersecurity and artificial intelligence laboratory for research and training, a rare capacity gain in the region's most degraded institutional environment.
- Structural capacity gap persists: the EU-supported CARICOM Cybercrime and Cybersecurity Action Plan launched 31 October 2025 records that Latin America and the Caribbean average a cybersecurity maturity score of 10.2 out of 20 — the least-protected region globally — with incidents growing about 25% annually, and Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago rated only Tier 3.
Outlook: No specific, credible threat to a named Caribbean government network is currently indicated, and the near-term trajecto…
Outlook: No specific, credible threat to a named Caribbean government network is currently indicated, and the near-term trajectory is capacity-building — more national CIRTs, a CARICOM AI governance push, and EU-funded resilience work. The realistic medium-term risk is opportunistic ransomware against universities, tax authorities and port IT systems, where the combination of Tier 3 maturity and high-value containerised trade data makes the region an attractive low-effort target.
Maritime & Territorial
ELEVATED
The maritime domain is where the Caribbean's security stresses converge: an active US interdiction and blockade regime, entrenched narcotics corridors, and unresolved boundary eco…
The maritime domain is where the Caribbean's security stresses converge: an active US interdiction and blockade regime, entrenched narcotics corridors, and unresolved boundary economics along the Venezuelan margin. Strike and interdiction operations continued through the first half of September on both the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific approaches, while the sanctioned-tanker blockade off Venezuela continues to distort commercial shipping in the southern basin. The Essequibo claim has been effectively frozen by Venezuela's post-intervention weakness rather than resolved, leaving the Guyana-Venezuela frontier a latent flashpoint. Unusually, hurricane-driven maritime risk is at a historic low this season, which removes one major disruption vector from the current quarter.
- 9 Sep 2026: a SOUTHCOM/JTF-WHEM lethal strike destroyed a go-fast vessel on established Caribbean n…
- The 'total and complete blockade' of US-sanctioned Venezuelan oil tankers ordered by President Trum…
- Essequibo: analysts assess the January 2026 US intervention has put Venezuela's claim to the oil- a…
- 9 Sep 2026: a SOUTHCOM/JTF-WHEM lethal strike destroyed a go-fast vessel on established Caribbean narco-trafficking routes, killing three; four days earlier, on 5 September, JTF-WHEM interdicted a multi-vessel floating refuelling station in the Eastern Pacific, showing simultaneous pressure on both maritime approaches to the isthmus.
- The 'total and complete blockade' of US-sanctioned Venezuelan oil tankers ordered by President Trump in December 2025 has continued into 2026, with loaded tankers intercepted in the southern Caribbean, directly affecting lanes off Venezuela, Trinidad and the ABC islands.
- Essequibo: analysts assess the January 2026 US intervention has put Venezuela's claim to the oil- and mineral-rich territory — roughly two-thirds of Guyana's landmass — on ice, though the ICJ proceedings, prior naval incursions into Guyanese waters and the convergence of interstate tension with organised crime keep the frontier a 2026 flashpoint.
- The Dominican Republic remains the Caribbean's principal transshipment hub: DNCD head Vice Admiral Félix Pimental has assessed at least 120 tonnes of cocaine transit the island annually, with national seizures rising roughly fivefold between 2019 and 2024, moved inland from unloading points on the sparsely policed southern coast to containerised export via Caucedo and Santo Domingo, predominantly toward Europe.
- Hurricane-driven maritime risk is at a record low: as of 10 September 2026 the Atlantic had produced five tropical storms (including Bertha, Dolly and Edouard) and zero hurricanes, setting a new satellite-era record for the latest first hurricane — surpassing 11 September in both 2002 and 2013 — with Caribbean and Atlantic wind shear the strongest on record for the date since 1979 under an intensifying El Niño.
- Trinidad-Venezuela boundary economics remain sanctions-hostage: the cross-border Dragon field straddles the delimitation line and was designed for a ~17 km subsea tieback delivering roughly 185 mmcf/d into Trinidadian facilities, but Caracas suspended the accord on 28 October 2025 after a US warship visit to Port of Spain.
Outlook: Interdiction pressure will keep displacing rather than eliminating flows, pushing traffickers toward semi-submersibles,…
Outlook: Interdiction pressure will keep displacing rather than eliminating flows, pushing traffickers toward semi-submersibles, containerised cargo and eastern Caribbean island-hopping routes through EEZs with minimal patrol capacity. The Essequibo dispute should stay dormant while Caracas is militarily and economically weak, but any consolidation of an assertive successor government in Venezuela would reopen it; meanwhile the record-quiet hurricane season means storm disruption is unlikely to be a material maritime risk factor before the season closes on 30 November.
EU Cooperation & Investment Portfolio 55 projects · EUR 9,797M · trade agreements in EU Global
★
EU
EU Cooperation & Investment Portfolio
Caribbean — Active programmes, partnerships & trade agreements
EUR 9,797M
Total Investment
55
Projects & Programmes
33
Countries Covered
46
Active
Top Sectors by Investment
Energy & Green Transition
3
EUR 6,997M
Infrastructure & Transport
6
EUR 1,037M
Development Cooperation
5
EUR 360M
Humanitarian
4
EUR 340M
Digital & ICT
3
EUR 215M
Flagship Projects
Regional Electricity Integration Initiative (LAC Component)
LACIF — Latin America Investment Facility
Haiti — MIP 2021-2027
Active (46)
Completed (8)
Planned (1)