Security Brief

Latin America Dashboard — Monday, Oct 26, 2026 — 18:34 UTC INTEL Sep 13
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The Essentials Intel as of Sep 13, 2026
  • Colombia's De la Espriella terminates Petro-era peace tracks and authorizes US military operations on Colombian soil — President Abelardo de la Espriella, sworn in 7 August 2026 after the narrowest presidential runoff in Colombian history against Ivan Cepeda, issued t…
  • Rubio signals potential unilateral US military action inside Mexican territory; Sheinbaum rejects intervention — US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on 10 September 2026 that Mexico is not doing enough against drug cartels and that Washington could act unil…
  • Venezuela's post-Maduro transition under Delcy Rodriguez enters contested electoral phase — Delcy Rodriguez, sworn in as acting president on 5 January 2026 after US forces captured Nicolas Maduro and Cilia Flores in Caracas on 3 January, con…
Threat level changes vs Sep 07
● Haiti CRITICAL
● Cuba HIGH
● Guyana ELEVATED
▼ Nicaragua ELEVATED from HIGH
Latest
Conflicts Latin America Regional Conflicts — September 13, 2026 Sep 13 Conflicts Latin America Regional Conflicts — September 7, 2026 Sep 07 EU Relations EU–Latin America Relations — September 13, 2026 Sep 13 EU Relations EU–Latin America Relations — September 7, 2026 Sep 07
Threat Intensity
Critical High Elevated Low
! Country Threat Matrix
LevelAssessment
Haiti Haiti CRITICAL Gangs control 80-90 percent of Port-au-Prince and are expanding into rural Kenscoff and the Artibonite; the Gang Suppression Force mandate expires 30 September 2026 with renewal uncertain and troop-contributor financing unresolved.
Venezuela Venezuela CRITICAL Unconsolidated post-Maduro transition under acting President Delcy Rodriguez with no electoral date, an armed Cabello-aligned security faction as spoiler, continued US military presence offshore, and an unresolved Essequibo claim that both government and opposition endorse.
Mexico Mexico HIGH Rubio's 10 September statement raised the prospect of unilateral US strikes on Mexican territory; eight cartels now hold FTO designations and tariff leverage is explicitly linked to security performance despite a claimed 40 percent homicide reduction.
Colombia Colombia HIGH De la Espriella's 9 September resolutions terminated ELN and Clan del Golfo negotiating tracks, returning Catatumbo, Arauca and Putumayo to open military confrontation, while US forces have reportedly been authorized to operate on Colombian soil.
Ecuador Ecuador HIGH Near-continuous emergency rule since January 2024; a fresh 60-day state of exception covers ten provinces after 879 homicides between 1 May and 12 June 2026, and the November 2025 referendum defeat blocked the Manta base option Noboa sought.
Bolivia Bolivia HIGH IMF projects a 3.3 percent contraction in 2026 amid exhausted reserves; fuel subsidy withdrawal has triggered blockades, an economy minister's dismissal on 21 August and open cocalero defiance of emergency rule on 4 September.
Cuba Cuba HIGH Total national grid collapse on 16 March 2026 and repeated failures since, driven by the severing of Venezuelan fuel supply under US pressure; rare street protests in Havana and no structural reform package from the Diaz-Canel government.
Peru Peru ELEVATED President Keiko Fujimori, inaugurated 28 July 2026 after a sub-50,000-vote margin, declared prison and territorial states of emergency in early September authorising 60 days of joint police-military operations against extortion networks, with fragile congressional backing.
Guyana Guyana ELEVATED Awaiting the ICJ merits judgment on the 1899 Arbitral Award following May 2026 oral hearings; Caracas has signalled it will disregard an adverse ruling, leaving offshore oil infrastructure as a high-value strategic vulnerability.
Brazil Brazil ELEVATED A statistically tied 4 October first round with Flavio Bolsonaro leading runoff simulations 47-45, compounded by 25 percent US tariffs tied to the Bolsonaro prosecution and residual post-2023 institutional distrust.
Nicaragua Nicaragua ELEVATED Institutionalised authoritarian consolidation under co-president Rosario Murillo and Laureano Ortega, with rule-of-law indicators the weakest in Central America and no functional electoral or judicial check.
Honduras Honduras ELEVATED President Nasry Asfura, sworn in January 2026 after a razor-thin win with vocal Trump backing, governs with a contested mandate while simultaneously courting Ortega's Nicaragua, straining his alignment with Washington.
Panama Panama MODERATE Canal Authority cut daily transits from September 2026 after May-August watershed rainfall came in 34 percent below average; the CK Hutchison port ownership dispute remains unresolved and SOUTHCOM has restored a military footprint.
Chile Chile MODERATE President Kast hit six months on 11 September with 34 percent approval and his flagship security reform stalled in committee, governing migration and border policy by emergency decree including a northern border barrier.
Argentina Argentina MODERATE Macro stabilisation is holding with inflation down to roughly 33 percent, GDP growth near 3.5 percent and poverty at 28.2 percent, but Milei lacks a congressional majority and the LLA-PRO coalition fractured during the 2026 budget passage.
LATAM Market Indicators
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● Key Developments
  • Colombia's De la Espriella terminates Petro-era peace tracks and authorizes US military operations on Colombian soil CRITICAL President Abelardo de la Espriella, sworn in 7 August 2026 after the narrowest presidential runoff in Colombian history against Ivan Cepeda, issued three executive resolutions on 9 September 2026 formally dismantling what remained of 'Paz Total': Resolution 391 revoked the ELN negotiating delegation, Resolution 390 revoked Clan del Golfo representatives, and Resolution 389 closed the Putumayo location zone, citing an absence of verifiable willingness for peace and continued ELN offensives in Catatumbo. The MercoPress first-month assessment published 7 September documented a comprehensive reversal of Petro's foreign policy, including restoration of relations with Israel, recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights on 10 August, recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, withdrawal from China's Belt and Road Initiative, and accession to the US-led 'Shield of the Americas' counter-narcotics coalition. Most consequentially, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth announced that Bogota had authorized US military operations on Colombian territory, a step no Colombian official has publicly confirmed, with stated priorities covering the Ecuadorian border, Pacific maritime surveillance, and air fleet rehabilitation. Bogota has further declared that all dealings with Caracas will now be channelled through the US State Department, effectively subcontracting bilateral Venezuela policy to Washington. Analysts including Sandra Borda have warned that this 'pre-emptive diplomacy to please' removes Colombian strategic autonomy at a moment of acute hemispheric uncertainty and forecloses off-ramps with an ELN that retains territorial control in Catatumbo and Arauca.
  • Rubio signals potential unilateral US military action inside Mexican territory; Sheinbaum rejects intervention HIGH US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on 10 September 2026 that Mexico is not doing enough against drug cartels and that Washington could act unilaterally inside Mexican territory, asserting that 'there are territories, vast territories in Mexico, that are not governed by the state. They are controlled by these narco-terrorist organizations.' The statement escalates a threat line Trump opened on 9 January 2026 when he said the US would 'start now hitting land' against cartels, and builds on the February 2025 Foreign Terrorist Organization designation of six Mexican cartels, expanded on 16 July 2026 to include the Juarez Cartel and Los Viagras. President Claudia Sheinbaum has categorically rejected foreign military intervention, insisting 'it's not going to happen' while pointing to Mexican results: roughly 40,000 arrests for serious crimes and a 40 percent homicide reduction between October 2024 and December 2025, 320 tons of drugs seized, and the transfer of 37 accused cartel figures to US custody on 20 January 2026. Mexico is simultaneously negotiating relief from US steel, aluminium and vehicle tariffs, a linkage Sheinbaum acknowledged at her 3 September mananera while insisting any agreement be reached 'without subordination.' The dual-track pressure of tariff leverage plus unilateral-strike threats leaves Sheinbaum with narrowing room to demonstrate sovereignty without rupturing the trade relationship that underpins Mexico's growth.
  • Venezuela's post-Maduro transition under Delcy Rodriguez enters contested electoral phase HIGH Delcy Rodriguez, sworn in as acting president on 5 January 2026 after US forces captured Nicolas Maduro and Cilia Flores in Caracas on 3 January, continues to govern an unconsolidated transition without a scheduled national election. Washington lifted sanctions on Rodriguez personally on 2 April 2026 in recognition of her authority, while Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, who commands networks across the security apparatus and pro-government colectivos, remains designated and constitutes the principal internal threat to her position. Rodriguez stated in early September that talks with the United States on sanctions relief and the creation of conditions for an electoral process are continuing, but declined to name a date; the US-facilitated dialogue between the government and a segment of the opposition began in August 2026 and is scheduled to resume in October. The government has released hundreds of political prisoners and legislated a blanket amnesty covering 1999 to the present, while the National Assembly approved a hydrocarbons reform designed to admit foreign capital, international arbitration and external audit into the oil sector. Maria Corina Machado has publicly cautioned the Trump administration against transacting with residual Chavista figures, framing the transition as 'unstoppable' but warning that legitimizing PSUV holdovers risks entrenching them. The central risk through Q4 2026 is a Cabello-aligned security bloc spoiling the electoral timetable, with colectivos and FAES remnants as the instrument.
  • Operation Southern Spear lethal maritime strike campaign passes 227 dead amid Pentagon inspector general review HIGH The US lethal interdiction campaign that began on 2 September 2025 with a strike on a Venezuela-departing vessel killing 11 has, as of 25 August 2026, killed at least 227 people, including 17 missing and presumed dead, across at least 68 strikes on 69 vessels. The campaign began in the southern Caribbean and expanded into the eastern Pacific in October 2025, with October recording the deadliest monthly toll at 45 killed; further eastern Pacific strikes have continued into 2026. The Department of Defense has not produced evidence that any interdicted vessel carried narcotics, and the Pentagon inspector general has opened an evaluation of the strikes. Legal critics contend the 'armed conflict' framing against 'narco-terrorists' lacks a valid jus ad bellum basis and that summary lethal force against suspected traffickers constitutes extrajudicial killing; operational critics note that fentanyl reaching the United States moves overland from Mexico rather than by Caribbean go-fast boat, making the campaign's counter-narcotics logic weak. The UN has repeatedly urged restraint. The strikes now function primarily as coercive signalling toward remaining non-aligned governments in the hemisphere rather than as supply interdiction, and they have become the template for the broader Shield of the Americas coalition launched 7 March 2026.
  • Brazil's presidential race narrows to a coin-flip three weeks before the 4 October first round ELEVATED Brazil votes in the first round on 4 October 2026 with a runoff scheduled for 25 October; the official campaign period closes 3 October. President Lula da Silva, seeking an unprecedented fourth non-consecutive term at 80, faces Senator Flavio Bolsonaro of the Liberal Party, standing in for his father Jair Bolsonaro, who is serving a 27-year sentence for the coup plot against the 2022 result. Lula led every late-August first-round poll, but the latest PoderData/Aya national survey put Flavio Bolsonaro two points ahead, 47-45, in a second-round simulation, his second consecutive runoff lead and the widest of the cycle. Self-help author Augusto Cury has emerged as the campaign's wild card, climbing from 1 percent to as high as 11 percent and threatening to fragment the first round. The 25 percent US tariffs imposed on Brazilian goods, explicitly tied by the Trump administration to the Bolsonaro prosecution, initially strengthened Lula's sovereignty framing, and Flavio Bolsonaro's 6 July appeal to Trump to defer tariffs until after the election underscored the liability; the economic squeeze, however, has since eroded that advantage. A Bolsonaro victory would deliver a fourth consecutive right-ward turn in South America's largest economies after Argentina, Chile, Bolivia and Colombia, and would complete the reversal of the 2022-24 'pink tide.'
  • Bolivia's Paz government faces compounding fiscal collapse and cocalero defiance of emergency rule HIGH President Rodrigo Paz Pereira, in office since 8 November 2025, is managing the most severe Bolivian economic contraction in decades, with the IMF projecting a 3.3 percent GDP decline in 2026 against nearly exhausted foreign currency reserves, collapsing natural gas output and a fiscal deficit above 10 percent of GDP. Paz declared a state of emergency on 20 June 2026 after weeks of blockades over living costs paralysed food, fuel and medical supply chains, and dismissed his economy minister on 21 August amid continued unrest. Supreme Decree 5676 of 17 August 2026 ended subsidised diesel for large consumers, roughly doubling the price from about USD 0.85 to USD 1.56 per litre, following an earlier decree that more than doubled retail gasoline and diesel prices and reversed twenty years of subsidy policy. YPFB president Sebastian Daroca publicly conceded on 18 August that the hydrocarbons crisis is structural and that the gap between international and domestic prices is beyond the state company's capacity to absorb. On 4 September 2026 thousands of coca growers loyal to Evo Morales marched in central Bolivia in open defiance of the state of exception, protesting fuel shortages and Paz's adjustment programme; a Bolivian court issued an arrest warrant against Morales on 29 July on terrorism and sedition charges linked to the May-June protest wave. Paz is simultaneously pursuing an IMF programme that will require deeper subsidy withdrawal, placing his fragile congressional coalition under acute strain.
  • Haiti's Gang Suppression Force faces a 30 September UN Security Council renewal vote as gangs expand beyond the capital CRITICAL The UN Security Council is scheduled to vote on 30 September 2026 on re-authorising the Gang Suppression Force, established for an initial twelve months by Resolution 2793 on 30 September 2025 as a non-UN multinational mission with a ceiling of 5,550 personnel, more than double the 2,500 envisaged under the never-realised MSS mission. The United States and Panama, co-penholders on the Haiti file, are leading the renewal effort; the Haitian government formally requested renewal on 4 September 2026. First GSF contingents arrived on 1 April 2026, but armed gangs still control an estimated 80 to 90 percent of Port-au-Prince and are pushing into the Artibonite and rural periphery. Attacks on the farming community of Kenscoff in September 2026 displaced over 2,600 people, with 50 kidnapped and at least 47 killed, demonstrating that the GSF has not yet degraded gang freedom of manoeuvre outside the capital core. Chatham House analysis published in September questions whether the Council will sustain the mandate given financing gaps and troop-contributor reluctance. Failure or a materially weakened renewal would leave the Haitian National Police unsupported ahead of the electoral process the Council has been assessing, and would accelerate displacement flows toward the Dominican Republic and the wider Caribbean.
⚑ Regional Hotspots
Catatumbo, Norte de Santander, Colombia
ELN territorial control zone on the Venezuelan border. After the January 2025 offensive that killed more than 80 and displaced 36,000, the region has seen renewed military escalation under De la Espriella, including the first airstrike of his presidency and the 9 September revocation of the ELN negotiating delegation, ending any near-term negotiated de-escalation.
Southern Caribbean maritime corridor off Venezuela
Operational theatre for Operation Southern Spear. At least 68 lethal strikes on 69 vessels have killed 227 people since 2 September 2025, with US warships, a submarine and roughly 4,000 Marines and sailors deployed offshore and a Pentagon inspector general evaluation now underway into the legality and targeting basis of the campaign.
Port-au-Prince and Kenscoff, Haiti
Armed gangs hold 80-90 percent of the capital and have pushed into the Kenscoff farming belt, where September 2026 attacks displaced over 2,600 people, kidnapped 50 and killed at least 47. The Gang Suppression Force mandate expires 30 September and the Haitian government formally requested renewal on 4 September.
Guayaquil and the Ecuadorian Pacific coast
Core of Ecuador's cocaine export infrastructure and the epicentre of transnational gang conflict. The current 60-day state of exception covers Guayas, Manabi, Los Rios, El Oro, Esmeraldas and five other provinces after 879 homicides between 1 May and 12 June 2026, mapping precisely onto the northern-border-to-Pacific trafficking corridor.
Sinaloa and Culiacan, Mexico
Locus of the intra-Sinaloa Cartel war and the reference point for Rubio's 10 September assertion that vast Mexican territories are governed by narco-terrorist organisations rather than the state. US-provided intelligence enabled the Mexican army's February 2026 operation against a top cartel leader, a precedent Washington now cites when threatening unilateral land strikes.
Essequibo region and the Guyana-Venezuela frontier
Two-thirds of Guyanese territory claimed by Caracas and overlaying one of the world's fastest-growing offshore oil provinces. ICJ merits hearings concluded 11 May 2026 with judgment expected this year; Venezuelan officials have indicated the ruling will be disregarded, and irregular armed actors and increased troop visibility persist along the border.
La Paz-El Alto and the Cochabamba tropics, Bolivia
Centre of gravity for the blockade movement that forced a state of emergency on 20 June 2026 and cut food, fuel and medical supply lines. Cocaleros aligned with Evo Morales marched in open defiance of emergency rule on 4 September, days after a terrorism and sedition warrant was issued against Morales on 29 July.
Panama Canal and the Gatun Lake watershed
Daily transits were reduced from September 2026 and Neopanamax draft increases postponed after May-August watershed rainfall ran 34 percent below average and inflows 44 percent below, against a projected severe 2026-27 El Nino. Over 70 percent of transiting cargo originates in or is bound for the United States, and the CK Hutchison port ownership dispute remains a live US-China flashpoint.
Thematic Intelligence Sep 13, 2026
Military & Defense
HIGH
The dominant military dynamic in Latin America remains the US counter-narcoterrorism campaign in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific, which passed its one-year mark on 2 September 2…
The dominant military dynamic in Latin America remains the US counter-narcoterrorism campaign in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific, which passed its one-year mark on 2 September 2026 and is being institutionalized into a permanent multinational command rather than wound down. Lethal strikes on suspected trafficking vessels resumed on 23 and 25 August 2026 after a roughly two-month pause, signalling that the post-Maduro transition in Caracas has not reduced US kinetic activity in the littoral. In parallel, cartel militarization in Mexico has proven durable: the February 2026 CJNG leadership decapitation triggered the most severe internal security shock in years and has left Mexico City managing an uneasy intelligence-sharing arrangement with Washington while refusing a US ground presence. Haiti represents the region's most acute force-generation failure, with a UN-backed suppression force deployed at roughly a fifth of authorized strength ahead of a mandate vote at end-September.
  • On 2 September 2026 SOUTHCOM and Joint Task Force Southern Spear briefed media on the operation's f…
  • US forces resumed lethal kinetic strikes on suspected narco-trafficking vessels on 23 and 25 August…
  • US Southern Command announced on 6 August 2026 the creation of Joint Task Force Western Hemisphere …
  • On 2 September 2026 SOUTHCOM and Joint Task Force Southern Spear briefed media on the operation's first year, claiming reductions in illicit maritime activity of roughly 65 percent in the western Caribbean, 60 percent in the eastern Caribbean and nearly 50 percent in key eastern Pacific corridors since the campaign began on 1 September 2025.
  • US forces resumed lethal kinetic strikes on suspected narco-trafficking vessels on 23 and 25 August 2026 after an approximately two-month pause, and reported three interdictions of narco-terrorist refueling vessels on 2, 3 and 5 September 2026, several of which were towing multiple small boats.
  • US Southern Command announced on 6 August 2026 the creation of Joint Task Force Western Hemisphere (JTF-WHEM), an 18-partner-nation structure intended to supersede Operation Southern Spear and convert a time-limited campaign into a standing regional command.
  • During an August 2026 visit to Panama, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth announced counter-drug military agreements with Colombia, Guatemala and Honduras; Guatemala subsequently publicly repudiated his characterization of the arrangement, exposing the fragility of the partner-nation coalition.
  • Haiti's Gang Suppression Force stood at just 1,083 military and 16 civilian personnel as of 8 July 2026 against an authorized ceiling of 5,500, with the original Kenyan contingent having departed in April 2026 and Chad, Jamaica, Mongolia and Sri Lanka now the principal contributors; the UN Security Council is scheduled to vote on renewal on 30 September 2026.
  • Mexico's cartel militarization remains unresolved after the 22-23 February 2026 Jalisco operation that killed CJNG leader Nemesio 'El Mencho' Oseguera Cervantes and triggered unrest with 252 roadblocks across 20 states, roughly 25 National Guard personnel killed and over 200 Oxxo stores damaged; Sheinbaum has since authorized US surveillance drone flights and coordinated patrols while maintaining a firm bar on US ground forces.
Outlook: Expect Operation Southern Spear's absorption into JTF-Western Hemisphere to lock in a persistent US strike and ISR post…
Outlook: Expect Operation Southern Spear's absorption into JTF-Western Hemisphere to lock in a persistent US strike and ISR posture across the Caribbean basin well into 2027, with periodic strike tempo surges rather than a drawdown. The most likely near-term escalation vectors are an expansion of strike authorities toward land targets in Mexico or Colombia and a failure to regenerate the Haiti force after the 30 September vote, which would cede further ground to gangs ahead of the December election.
Diplomatic & Political
ELEVATED
Latin America enters the final quarter of 2026 with an unusually dense electoral and legitimacy calendar. Brazil's 4 October general election is effectively a coin flip between Lu…
Latin America enters the final quarter of 2026 with an unusually dense electoral and legitimacy calendar. Brazil's 4 October general election is effectively a coin flip between Lula's bid for a fourth term and Senator Flavio Bolsonaro, with runoff polling inside the margin of error and public security displacing the economy as the top voter concern. Venezuela's interim government under Delcy Rodriguez has exceeded its constitutional mandate without setting an electoral calendar, and Haiti's transitional authorities are dependent on a Security Council vote to preserve the security conditions for a December poll. The regional ideological map has continued to shift right with Kast in Chile and Fujimori in Peru, narrowing Lula's coalition for regional initiatives.
  • Brazil's general election is set for 4 October 2026 with the campaign closing 3 October; a PoderDat…
  • Venezuela's interim government led by Delcy Rodriguez passed the 180-day limit for an acting presid…
  • Haiti's government formally requested renewal of the Gang Suppression Force on 4 September 2026 ahe…
  • Brazil's general election is set for 4 October 2026 with the campaign closing 3 October; a PoderData/Aya runoff simulation published 10 September 2026 showed Flavio Bolsonaro 47 to Lula 45, reversing Lula's 46-45 lead of mid-August, while a September Datafolha runoff poll showed Lula 46 to Bolsonaro 43 - both within the margin of error, with 13 candidates having registered by 15 August.
  • Venezuela's interim government led by Delcy Rodriguez passed the 180-day limit for an acting presidency under the 1999 constitution in early July 2026 without announcing elections; analysts now project regional and then national votes no earlier than mid-to-late 2027, with Diosdado Cabello retained as interior minister despite a standing 25 million dollar US reward.
  • Haiti's government formally requested renewal of the Gang Suppression Force on 4 September 2026 ahead of a 30 September Security Council vote, with a first-round presidential election scheduled for 13 December 2026 and a possible runoff on 21 February 2027 - the first Haitian elections since 2016.
  • Between 6 March and 31 July 2026 the UN recorded at least 613 deaths, 375 injuries, over 176 women and girls subjected to sexual violence and more than 18,000 newly displaced in Haiti, against a total IDP population of roughly 1.5 million.
  • US-Colombia relations remain structurally damaged after the 15 September 2025 decertification - the first in nearly three decades - and the October 2025 aid cutoff and tariff threats; Petro's 2 February 2026 visit to Washington marked a partial de-escalation but did not restore certification.
  • The regional balance shifted further right as Jose Antonio Kast was inaugurated in Chile on 11 March 2026 and Keiko Fujimori took office in Peru on 28 July 2026, while Ecuador's opposition Alianza Ciudadana alleges Noboa and the courts are blocking it from November 2026 elections.
Outlook: Brazil's 4 October vote and probable runoff is the single highest-consequence political event of the quarter; a Flavio …
Outlook: Brazil's 4 October vote and probable runoff is the single highest-consequence political event of the quarter; a Flavio Bolsonaro win would realign Brasilia with Washington on tariffs, Venezuela policy and gang designations, while a narrow Lula win risks a contested-result mobilization by the right. Venezuela's stalled transition is the most likely source of a legitimacy crisis in 2027, and failure to renew Haiti's mandate on 30 September would probably make the December election unworkable.
Economic & Trade
MODERATE
Trade policy is the region's most active economic front, with the EU-Mercosur interim trade agreement now in provisional application and a parallel US tariff campaign targeting Br…
Trade policy is the region's most active economic front, with the EU-Mercosur interim trade agreement now in provisional application and a parallel US tariff campaign targeting Brazil. The Brussels channel opened in May 2026 but was immediately tested by a sanitary suspension of major Brazilian animal-protein exports on 3 September 2026, illustrating how non-tariff measures can neutralize headline liberalization. Critical minerals have become the region's principal inbound investment story, with Chile, Argentina, Bolivia and Peru moving toward a coordinated framework in late August 2026 amid US-China competition for Andean lithium and copper. Macro risk is concentrated in Argentina's exchange-rate regime and in Brazilian export exposure to US tariff action during an election.
  • The EU-Mercosur interim Trade Agreement has been provisionally applied since 1 May 2026 after 25 ye…
  • On 3 September 2026 the European Commission suspended imports of Brazilian beef, poultry, eggs and …
  • The European Parliament's January 2026 referral of the agreement to the Court of Justice has suspen…
  • The EU-Mercosur interim Trade Agreement has been provisionally applied since 1 May 2026 after 25 years of negotiation, phasing out tariffs on roughly 96 percent of EU goods entering Mercosur over 15 years and opening quotas of 99,000 tonnes of beef at a 7.5 percent tariff, 180,000 tonnes of poultry, 180,000 tonnes of sugar and 450,000 tonnes of industrial ethanol duty-free from day one.
  • On 3 September 2026 the European Commission suspended imports of Brazilian beef, poultry, eggs and honey after Brazil failed to demonstrate that its cattle met long-standing EU rules barring antibiotic growth promoters - a direct hit to the sector that the Mercosur deal was meant to benefit.
  • The European Parliament's January 2026 referral of the agreement to the Court of Justice has suspended the full ratification procedure for the Partnership Agreement, which still requires approval by all 27 national parliaments against opposition from farm lobbies in France, Poland and Ireland, though it does not affect provisional application of the trade pillar.
  • On 15 July 2026 the Trump administration imposed 25 percent tariffs on a range of Brazilian imports following a USTR investigation citing illegal deforestation and electronic payment practices; Brasilia called the date 'a regrettable milestone' in bilateral relations, after Flavio Bolsonaro had asked Trump on 6 July to defer any decision until after the October election.
  • On 28 August 2026 Chile, Argentina, Bolivia and Peru signed a joint declaration on strategic minerals; Chilean economy and mining minister Daniel Mas said reviving the Chile-Argentina mining integration treaty would unlock more than 20.7 billion dollars in investment and add 540,000 tonnes of copper per year to global supply.
  • Argentina announced a critical-minerals partnership with South Korea covering the entire lithium value chain on 31 July 2026; Argentina and Chile together hold about 40 percent of global lithium reserves and produced roughly 79,000 tonnes of lithium metal content in 2025, while Chile and Peru hold about 30 percent of world copper reserves.
Outlook: Provisional application gives Mercosur exporters a durable tariff channel regardless of the CJEU referral, but the 3 Se…
Outlook: Provisional application gives Mercosur exporters a durable tariff channel regardless of the CJEU referral, but the 3 September animal-protein suspension signals that sanitary and deforestation-linked barriers will be the binding constraint rather than tariffs. Watch for a US tariff recalibration toward Brazil immediately after the 4 October election and for a first tranche of binding Andean minerals-integration commitments before year-end; Argentina's overvalued managed band remains the main tail risk to regional financial stability.
Cyber & Technology
ELEVATED
Latin America has consolidated its position as the world's most ransomware-targeted region, and the September 2026 picture is one of both rising volume and rising sophistication. …
Latin America has consolidated its position as the world's most ransomware-targeted region, and the September 2026 picture is one of both rising volume and rising sophistication. Financially motivated local actors are now demonstrating tradecraft previously associated with state-linked APTs, including proprietary reconnaissance tooling and collection of SSL private keys and mobile device management data. Government and public-administration data remains the region's most-breached category, with health, justice and municipal utility systems repeatedly compromised. Chinese and Iranian state-nexus activity against South American telecommunications and financial infrastructure adds a strategic espionage layer on top of the criminal baseline.
  • On 1 September 2026 the Direwolf ransomware group claimed a breach of Oportunidados, a Brazilian bu…
  • CYFIRMA's 4 September 2026 weekly intelligence report identified the Fiasco double-extortion ransom…
  • Brazil recorded 99 confirmed ransomware attacks in the first half of 2026, accounting for 36.3 perc…
  • On 1 September 2026 the Direwolf ransomware group claimed a breach of Oportunidados, a Brazilian business-services firm, threatening to publish sensitive corporate data if negotiations did not begin.
  • CYFIRMA's 4 September 2026 weekly intelligence report identified the Fiasco double-extortion ransomware - which encrypts with AES and appends a .secure extension - as actively targeting Colombia and Chile, alongside the Krybit ransomware-as-a-service affiliate model listing Brazil among its primary targets since January 2026.
  • Brazil recorded 99 confirmed ransomware attacks in the first half of 2026, accounting for 36.3 percent of the 273 incidents detected across Latin America, with Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Argentina and Chile together representing more than three quarters of regional attacks.
  • Operation Escaneo, disclosed in June 2026 and attributed with medium confidence to the financially motivated MexicanMafia/PanchoVilla actor, targeted critical infrastructure in Mexico, Ecuador and Portugal across 2025-2026 using a proprietary reconnaissance engine called Kimera, known Fortinet, Ivanti and Apache Tomcat CVEs, Neo-reGeorg webshells and Chisel reverse tunnels, and atypically exfiltrated SSL private keys and MDM infrastructure data.
  • In March 2026 Cisco Talos reported that China-nexus actor UAT-9244 - closely associated with FamousSparrow and overlapping with Salt Typhoon - had been targeting South American telecommunications infrastructure since 2024 using the TernDoor, PeerTime and BruteEntry implants against Windows, Linux and edge devices.
  • Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 tracked two concurrent Latin American campaigns - one against Mexican transportation and one against Brazilian finance - with the first also reaching Mexican federal government ministries and municipal water utilities in Mexico and Ecuador, while Colombia's health ministry logged more than 23 million attempted attacks in March 2026 and a ransomware intrusion struck Colombia's justice ministry during the presidential transition.
Outlook: The convergence of criminal and APT tradecraft demonstrated by Operation Escaneo means regional defenders should expect…
Outlook: The convergence of criminal and APT tradecraft demonstrated by Operation Escaneo means regional defenders should expect edge-device exploitation, credential-material theft and long-dwell intrusions rather than smash-and-grab encryption alone. Brazil's October election and Haiti's December poll are natural focal points for hacktivist defacement and influence operations, while Chinese telecom-sector collection in South America is likely to persist and expand toward energy and port operators.
Maritime & Territorial
ELEVATED
Maritime risk in the Americas is concentrated in three separable problems: hydrological constraint on the Panama Canal, the Guyana-Venezuela Essequibo case now approaching an ICJ …
Maritime risk in the Americas is concentrated in three separable problems: hydrological constraint on the Panama Canal, the Guyana-Venezuela Essequibo case now approaching an ICJ merits decision, and a structurally entrenched distant-water fishing presence in the Southwest Atlantic and eastern Pacific. Canal operations recovered strongly from the 2023-24 drought but a rainfall deficit of roughly 34 percent across the watershed from May to August 2026, combined with an El Nino watch, has already forced a reduction in daily slots and raises real risk for the 2027 dry season. Panama's cancellation of the CK Hutchison port concessions has converted a commercial dispute into a multi-billion-dollar arbitration with geopolitical overtones. Foreign fishing pressure has shifted from an external fleet problem to a domestic ownership problem in Argentina.
  • Panama Canal watershed rainfall from May through August 2026 ran about 34 percent below the long-te…
  • The canal recorded 6,288 transits in the first half of fiscal 2026, up 224 year-on-year with cargo …
  • Panama formally annulled CK Hutchison's Balboa and Cristobal port concessions on 24 February 2026 f…
  • Panama Canal watershed rainfall from May through August 2026 ran about 34 percent below the long-term average, prompting the Canal Authority to cut daily transit capacity from 36 vessels to 34; Gatun Lake stood at 87.7 feet in August 2026 with a 50-foot draft, down from a 88.9-foot peak on 7 February 2026 that had triggered preventive discharge.
  • The canal recorded 6,288 transits in the first half of fiscal 2026, up 224 year-on-year with cargo tonnage up about 5 percent, after FY2025 revenue of 5.7 billion dollars and 13,404 transits; the 1.6 billion dollar Rio Indio reservoir, the structural fix, does not begin construction until 2027 and will not be operational before 2032-33.
  • Panama formally annulled CK Hutchison's Balboa and Cristobal port concessions on 24 February 2026 following a Supreme Court ruling, handing interim operations to A.P. Moller-Maersk and MSC; Hutchison is seeking more than 1.5 billion dollars in damages through international arbitration while the Canal Authority has launched a global consultation for new terminals on both coasts.
  • The ICJ case Guyana v. Venezuela over the Essequibo advanced to oral hearings in May 2026 with a merits decision anticipated around August 2026, while Caracas continues to reject the Court's jurisdiction - leaving a legally binding ruling without an enforcement mechanism over territory comprising roughly two-thirds of Guyana.
  • Approximately 600 to 700 Chinese distant-water vessels operate continuously off South America out of a global fleet of about 16,000; Argentina identified 148 Chinese-flagged vessels in transit during the squid season, and fishing effort at the 'Mile 201' EEZ boundary rose from 62,000 to 400,000 hours per 500 square kilometres between 2013 and 2023.
  • An IUU investigation found Chinese-controlled companies now own nearly two thirds of the vessels licensed to fish squid inside Argentine waters against 17.9 percent Argentine capital, and took 64 percent of total catch share in early 2026; Japan allocated 1.9 million dollars in January 2026 for maritime surveillance support to Argentina, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay.
Outlook: If the 2026 wet season closes below average, the Panama Canal will enter the 2027 dry season with insufficient storage …
Outlook: If the 2026 wet season closes below average, the Panama Canal will enter the 2027 dry season with insufficient storage to sustain 34-36 daily slots, pushing draft restrictions and auction premiums back onto Asia-US East Coast routes well before Rio Indio delivers. An ICJ merits ruling for Guyana that Caracas rejects would not by itself trigger conflict given the current US posture and Venezuela's transitional weakness, but it would harden the dispute into a permanent grey-zone problem centred on illegal mining and criminal networks in the border zone.
EU Cooperation & Investment Portfolio 34 projects · EUR 3,201M · trade agreements in EU Global
★ EU
EU Cooperation & Investment Portfolio
Latin America — Active programmes, partnerships & trade agreements
EUR 3,201M
Total Investment
34
Projects & Programmes
22
Countries Covered
33
Active
Top Sectors by Investment
Infrastructure & Transport 3 EUR 926M
Climate & Environment 7 EUR 612M
Governance & Rule of Law 5 EUR 600M
Humanitarian 1 EUR 572M
Energy & Green Transition 6 EUR 298M
Flagship Projects
LACIF — Latin America Investment Facility
EUR 856M 2010–2027 ACTIVE
Venezuela — Humanitarian Response
EUR 572M 2016–2027 ACTIVE
EUROCLIMA+ — Climate Programme for LAC
EUR 265M 2010–2027 ACTIVE
Active (33) Completed (0) Planned (1)