Security Brief

Africa & Indian Ocean Dashboard — Monday, Oct 26, 2026 — 21:51 UTC INTEL Sep 13
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The Essentials Intel as of Sep 13, 2026
  • Houthi seizure of Mocha, Dhubab and Perim (Mayun) Island gives Iran-aligned forces effective control of Bab el-Mandeb — Houthi forces captured the historic port of Mocha on 10 September 2026 and followed on 11 September by taking Perim (Mayun) Island and the coastal to…
  • Sudan's war regionalizes as RSF drone campaign in Kordofan deepens and Chad places forces on highest alert — An RSF drone strike on the judicial headquarters in Um Rawaba, North Kordofan, on 8 September 2026 killed at least 13 people and wounded 22 during pe…
  • Niger junta survives 28-29 August coup attempt only through Russian and Algerian intervention — On the night of 28-29 August 2026 a mutinous faction styling itself the Armed Forces for the Restoration of the Fatherland (FARP) moved against Presi…
Threat level changes vs Sep 07
● Mali CRITICAL
● Burkina Faso CRITICAL
● Niger HIGH
● Democratic Republic of the Congo HIGH
▼ Ethiopia HIGH from CRITICAL
● Nigeria HIGH
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Conflicts Africa & Indian Ocean Regional Conflicts — September 13, 20… Sep 13 Conflicts Africa & Indian Ocean Regional Conflicts — September 7, 2026 Sep 07 EU Relations EU–Africa & Indian Ocean Relations — September 13, 2026 Sep 13 EU Relations EU–Africa & Indian Ocean Relations — September 7, 2026 Sep 07
Threat Intensity
Critical High Elevated Low
! Country Threat Matrix
LevelAssessment
Sudan Sudan CRITICAL Active civil war with RSF drone strikes on North Kordofan (Um Rawaba courthouse, 8 September 2026, 13 killed), El Obeid encircled with ~500,000 trapped, famine and mass atrocity precedent from El Fasher's fall, and over 14 million displaced.
Mali Mali CRITICAL JNIM fuel blockade has strangled Bamako for a year with 300-plus tankers destroyed; the defence minister was killed in April 2026; the junta depends on Russian Africa Corps support that has failed to restore freedom of movement.
Burkina Faso Burkina Faso CRITICAL Largest share of Sahel militant Islamist fatalities, with JNIM and ISSP contesting the majority of national territory, recurrent siege-and-blockade tactics against provincial capitals, and a junta reliant on poorly trained VDP auxiliaries.
Niger Niger HIGH Coup attempt on 28-29 August 2026 defeated only with Russian and Algerian military intervention, exposing deep officer-corps fractures amid mounting casualties against ISSP and JNIM and withdrawal from the Multinational Joint Task Force.
Somalia Somalia HIGH Al-Shabaab attacks in Lower Shabelle up roughly 60 percent June-August 2026, AUSSOM drawdown and financing crisis, continued US strikes including 4 September, and cross-border operations into Kenya's Mandera county.
Democratic Republic of the Congo Democratic Republic of the Congo HIGH FARDC-M23 combat continues in the Fizi and Uvira highlands despite the Doha Framework, only two of eight protocols signed, Rwandan-backed M23 holding Uvira since December 2025, and a Bundibugyo Ebola outbreak with 2,325 deaths.
Ethiopia Ethiopia HIGH Collapse of Pretoria Agreement implementation, TDF seizures at Alamata and Korem, August 2026 fighting in western Tigray, emergence of the Tsimdo TPLF-Fano-OLA coalition, and escalating confrontation with Eritrea over Red Sea access.
Nigeria Nigeria HIGH Concurrent ISWAP and Boko Haram insurgency in Borno, a worsening northwest banditry crisis with emerging bandit-jihadist alliances, and a widening security divide with AES neighbours after Niger's MNJTF withdrawal.
Chad Chad ELEVATED Forces on highest alert after a 20 August 2026 air and drone strike more than 100 kilometres inside Ennedi-Est; armour and counter-drone systems deployed near Tine; hosting large Sudanese refugee flows along a 1,300-kilometre porous border.
Eritrea Eritrea ELEVATED Reported TPLF outreach via Dubai and Zalambessa and tacit Saudi and Egyptian backing against Ethiopian Red Sea ambitions position Asmara for proxy escalation; Assab's status remains the central flashpoint.
Djibouti Djibouti ELEVATED Transit economy and multinational basing sit adjacent to a Bab el-Mandeb now under effective Houthi control following the 10-11 September 2026 seizures of Mocha, Dhubab and Perim Island.
Libya Libya ELEVATED Entrenched GNU-LNA partition with Dbeibah and Haftar contesting national authority, recurrent Tripoli militia mobilisation over security appointments, and a role as a transit corridor in external resupply to Sudan's RSF.
Mozambique Mozambique ELEVATED Islamic State-linked ASWJ, assessed by the UN at 400-500 fighters, raided a hunting lodge near Marangira on the Niassa Special Reserve in early September 2026, seizing foreign and local hostages and demonstrating expansion beyond core Cabo Delgado districts.
Rwanda Rwanda MODERATE Not experiencing internal instability, but sustained support to M23 and rejection of Kinshasa's FDLR disarmament protocol as a delaying tactic keep Kigali exposed to sanctions pressure and to escalation risk in the Great Lakes.
Madagascar Madagascar MODERATE No active armed conflict, but exposure to IUU fishing, maritime trafficking and transnational organised crime across a vast EEZ, with regional partners warning of renewed Somali piracy and spillover from Red Sea disruption.
SADC Market Indicators
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● Key Developments
  • Houthi seizure of Mocha, Dhubab and Perim (Mayun) Island gives Iran-aligned forces effective control of Bab el-Mandeb CRITICAL Houthi forces captured the historic port of Mocha on 10 September 2026 and followed on 11 September by taking Perim (Mayun) Island and the coastal town of Dhubab, completing a rapid consolidation of Yemen's Red Sea littoral. The seizure gives the movement effective — though not sovereign — control of the eastern side of the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint, the maritime gateway linking the Gulf of Aden to the Suez corridor and the principal artery for Horn of Africa trade. Reporting on 11-12 September noted that Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline was shut after drone attacks and that Brent crude broke $100 per barrel for the first time since mid-May, with the Strait of Hormuz already degraded since US-Israel operations began in late February 2026. The UN recorded at least 46,000 people displaced since the escalation, and MARAD maintained advisory 2026-006 covering the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea and Somali Basin. For Africa the second-order effects are acute: Djibouti's transit economy, Ethiopia's import lifeline, Eritrean and Sudanese Red Sea ports, and the viability of Berbera as an alternative all now sit inside a contested war zone.
  • Sudan's war regionalizes as RSF drone campaign in Kordofan deepens and Chad places forces on highest alert CRITICAL An RSF drone strike on the judicial headquarters in Um Rawaba, North Kordofan, on 8 September 2026 killed at least 13 people and wounded 22 during peak hours, extending a sustained standoff-strike campaign against El Obeid and surrounding North Kordofan towns. El Obeid — the strategic node linking RSF-held Darfur to central Sudan — remains encircled with roughly 500,000 residents trapped including some 105,000 displaced, food prices up 300 percent and repeated strikes on power and water infrastructure, a trajectory UN officials have explicitly compared to El Fasher before it fell to the RSF in late October 2025 amid what the UN described as the hallmarks of genocide. The conflict is now spilling decisively across borders: on 20 August 2026 aircraft and drones tied to the Sudanese war bombed a convoy more than 100 kilometres inside Chad's Ennedi-Est province, prompting a 22 August warning from the Chadian military, an order from President Mahamat Déby to retaliate after a drone strike killed 16, and the deployment of roughly 100 armoured vehicles plus drone-jamming equipment near the border town of Tine. Analysts assess that Khartoum's deteriorating relations with Chad and Ethiopia — both identified as transit routes for external RSF resupply alongside Libya, Somalia, South Sudan and the CAR — raise a real risk of interstate confrontation, even if each capital faces constraints that argue against full escalation. Sudan remains the world's largest displacement crisis at over 14 million refugees and IDPs.
  • Niger junta survives 28-29 August coup attempt only through Russian and Algerian intervention HIGH On the night of 28-29 August 2026 a mutinous faction styling itself the Armed Forces for the Restoration of the Fatherland (FARP) moved against President Abdourahamane Tiani, striking the Presidential Palace, the ORTN state broadcaster headquarters, Diori Hamani International Airport and Base Aérienne 101 in Niamey, the facility hosting Russia's Africa Corps. At least three Presidential Guard members were killed and dozens of soldiers were arrested in the following days, with authorities seizing 382 AK-47 rifles, 36 RPG-7 launchers, 30 PKM machine guns and 34 Toyota Hilux technicals. Russia's Ministry of Defence confirmed it provided ground and aerial support that helped recapture Base 101, and Algeria deployed four Su-30 fighters to Niamey on 30 August as demonstrative backing. Grievances cited by the plotters — mounting casualties against Islamic State Sahel Province and JNIM, and resource favouritism toward Tiani's parent Presidential Guard — indicate structural fractures in the Nigerien officer corps rather than an isolated conspiracy. The episode establishes external patrons as the decisive arbiter of regime survival across the Alliance of Sahel States and raises the probability of further coup attempts in Bamako, Ouagadougou and Niamey.
  • JNIM fuel blockade continues to strangle Bamako as Mali becomes the Sahel's centre of gravity CRITICAL JNIM's fuel interdiction campaign, announced by spokesman Abou Houzeifa al-Bambari on 3 September 2025 and escalated to a declared full blockade of Bamako on 28 April 2026, has now held for a full year, with more than 300 tankers destroyed and the capital supplied only by armed convoy. Mali imports roughly 95 percent of its fuel by road from Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire, and open-source reporting describes rationing that prioritises military and government consumption, rolling blackouts and a visibly darkened capital at night. Neither Russia's Africa Corps nor Turkish-supplied armed drones have broken the interdiction, and negotiations with the jihadists have repeatedly stalled. The campaign sits alongside JNIM's demonstrated reach against the state's core — including the coordinated 25 April 2026 attacks that killed Defence Minister Sadio Camara in an operation involving JNIM and the Azawad Liberation Front. The Sahel now accounts for roughly one in five global militant Islamist attacks and 51 percent of worldwide terrorism deaths, with nearly 49,000 conflict fatalities since 2022, making economic strangulation of a capital city a proven and replicable insurgent method.
  • Ethiopia edges toward a multi-front war as the Tsimdo coalition consolidates and Eritrea hedges HIGH Four years after the November 2022 Pretoria Agreement, the Tigray settlement is collapsing: TDF-aligned forces crossed the Tekeze River into the disputed Tselemt district in January 2026 and subsequently took Alamata and Korem after a federal command post withdrew, and fighting resumed in western Tigray near the Sudanese border in August 2026. Reporting through early September 2026 describes the emergence of Tsimdo, an anti-federal coalition bringing the TPLF together with Amhara Fano militias and the Oromo Liberation Army, alongside renewed TPLF-Eritrean contacts reportedly conducted in Dubai and at Zalambessa — a realignment that would have been unthinkable during the 2020-2022 war. A drone strike on Mekelle marked the most recent escalation between the ENDF and TPLF, and roughly 1.9 million people remain displaced with returns blocked in contested Welkait, Tsegede, Humera and Raya. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's continued pursuit of sovereign Red Sea access is the structural driver, with Saudi Arabia and Egypt tilting toward Asmara to constrain Addis Ababa. The combination of a hostile Eritrea, an armed and politically reunified Tigray under Debretsion Gebremichael since May 2026, and active Fano and OLA insurgencies presents the highest risk of interstate war in the Horn since 2020.
  • Doha process stalls at two of eight protocols while fighting continues in the South Kivu highlands HIGH The Doha Framework signed between the DRC government and AFC/M23 on 15 November 2025 has advanced only marginally: just two of eight protocols — covering ceasefire oversight and detainee release — are signed, leaving humanitarian access, restoration of state authority, security arrangements, displacement and transitional justice unresolved. Talks in Switzerland from 17 to 21 August 2026, with US, Qatari, Togolese, Swiss and AU Commission participation, produced a sequenced negotiating roadmap announced around 23 August, and a prisoner exchange saw 15 detainees released on 7 August, but the Security Council's September 2026 assessment states that FARDC-M23 fighting has continued unabated. As of the 4 September 2026 reporting cycle, significant combat persisted in the Fizi and Uvira highlands of South Kivu, with pro-government forces mounting offensives intended to pressure M23's western flank following the group's capture of Uvira in December 2025. Kinshasa's 28 July FDLR disarmament protocol has been dismissed by Kigali as a delaying tactic, and the Washington Accords' Joint Security Coordination Mechanism met for a sixth time in August with trilateral coordination planned for October. Compounding the crisis, an ongoing Ebola outbreak of the Bundibugyo strain has caused 2,325 deaths against 4,945 confirmed cases, with uncertain vaccine efficacy.
  • Al-Shabaab presses Mogadishu's periphery as AUSSOM's future and financing remain unresolved HIGH US Africa Command conducted an airstrike against al-Shabaab approximately 175 kilometres west of Mogadishu on 4 September 2026 in coordination with the Federal Government of Somalia, part of a sustained but attritional air campaign. Al-Shabaab increased attacks in Lower Shabelle by roughly 60 percent between June and August 2026 compared with January to May, consolidating pressure on the capital's outskirts, and conducted more attacks in Kenya's Mandera county in June and July than in the preceding five months combined, including a 28 July strike that killed five Kenyan soldiers. The African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia has begun an accelerated handover to Somali forces amid an unresolved financing shortfall, and assessments from August 2026 describe the mission as in peril while Somali security institutions remain unready to assume full responsibility. Puntland has meanwhile consolidated territorial gains against the Islamic State's Somalia province, producing a divergence between a strengthening federal member state and a weakening centre. Resurgent insurgent capability, fragmented federal politics and a drawdown of external stabilisation support form a compounding risk set heading into 2027.
⚑ Regional Hotspots
Bab el-Mandeb Strait and Perim (Mayun) Island
Houthi forces seized Mocha on 10 September 2026 and Perim Island plus Dhubab on 11 September, establishing effective control of the eastern littoral of the strait that carries Horn of Africa trade, Ethiopian imports and Djiboutian transit traffic. MARAD advisory 2026-006 remains in force and the UN reports 46,000-plus newly displaced.
El Obeid and North Kordofan, Sudan
RSF encirclement of North Kordofan's capital has trapped roughly 500,000 residents including 105,000 displaced, with sustained drone strikes on power and water infrastructure and a 8 September 2026 strike on the Um Rawaba courthouse killing at least 13. El Obeid is the hinge linking RSF-held Darfur to central Sudan.
El Fasher and Darfur, Sudan
RSF capture of El Fasher in late October 2025 after an 18-month siege produced mass killings characterised by Amnesty International as ethnic cleansing and by the UN as bearing the hallmarks of genocide, with famine confirmed. Darfur now functions as the RSF's consolidated rear base and parallel administrative core.
Bamako and the Mali fuel corridors
JNIM's interdiction of the Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire fuel routes has kept Mali's capital on convoy-only resupply for a year, destroying more than 300 tankers and forcing rationing and rolling blackouts in a city of over two million. It is the most advanced insurgent economic-strangulation campaign in West Africa.
Fizi-Uvira highlands, South Kivu, DRC
Pro-government FARDC and Wazalendo offensives against M23 and allied fighters continued through the 4 September 2026 reporting cycle, aimed at pressuring M23's western flank after the group's December 2025 capture of Uvira severed the FARDC's principal southern supply route.
Tigray and the Ethiopia-Eritrea frontier
A drone strike on Mekelle, the January 2026 TDF crossing of the Tekeze into Tselemt, seizures of Alamata and Korem, and renewed August 2026 fighting in western Tigray have effectively voided the Pretoria Agreement, with the Tsimdo coalition and reported TPLF-Asmara contacts raising interstate war risk.
Chad-Sudan border at Tine, Ennedi-Est
Following a 20 August 2026 air and drone attack on a convoy more than 100 kilometres inside Chadian territory, N'Djamena placed its forces on highest alert on 22 August and deployed roughly 100 armoured vehicles with drone-jamming equipment to the frontier, the sharpest Chad-Sudan escalation of the war to date.
Cabo Delgado and Niassa Reserve, Mozambique
Islamic State-linked ASWJ fighters, assessed by the UN at 400-500 strong, struck a hunting lodge, police post and medical centre near Marangira on the edge of the Niassa Special Reserve in early September 2026, abducting a South African mechanic and camp staff and signalling westward expansion from core Cabo Delgado districts.
Thematic Intelligence Sep 13, 2026
Military & Defense
HIGH
Africa's conflict load is concentrated in three simultaneous high-intensity theatres - the Sahel, Sudan and eastern DRC - with Somalia degrading as a fourth. The Sahel remains the…
Africa's conflict load is concentrated in three simultaneous high-intensity theatres - the Sahel, Sudan and eastern DRC - with Somalia degrading as a fourth. The Sahel remains the world's deadliest jihadist theatre, and JNIM has shifted from territorial contestation to economic strangulation of Bamako, a model that coastal West African states now fear. In Sudan, the RSF has consolidated Darfur after the fall of El Fasher and is prosecuting a deep-strike drone campaign into Kordofan while the SAF counterattacks in the west. External military underwriting is now decisive: Russia's Africa Corps is embedded in AES regime-protection roles, Turkish drones sustain junta operations, and US strike operations continue in Somalia even as AUSSOM's funding and mandate remain unresolved.
  • 4 Sep 2026: US AFRICOM conducted an airstrike against al-Shabaab approximately 175 km west of Mogad…
  • 8 Sep 2026: An RSF drone struck the judicial headquarters in Um Rawaba, North Kordofan, during peak…
  • JNIM's fuel blockade of Bamako, first declared 3 Sep 2025 and re-imposed in full on 28 Apr 2026, ha…
  • 4 Sep 2026: US AFRICOM conducted an airstrike against al-Shabaab approximately 175 km west of Mogadishu in coordination with the Federal Government of Somalia, continuing a sustained US strike tempo despite unresolved AUSSOM financing.
  • 8 Sep 2026: An RSF drone struck the judicial headquarters in Um Rawaba, North Kordofan, during peak hours, killing at least 13 and wounding 22 - part of an intensified RSF deep-strike campaign across North Kordofan including El Obeid.
  • JNIM's fuel blockade of Bamako, first declared 3 Sep 2025 and re-imposed in full on 28 Apr 2026, has now held for a year; over 300 fuel tankers have been destroyed and the capital is resupplied only by armed convoy in a country importing roughly 95% of its fuel by road from Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire.
  • Late Aug 2026: Russia's Africa Corps assisted Niger's presidential guard in suppressing a mutiny at a Niamey military base, according to Russia's ambassador - evidence that Russian personnel now perform regime-protection, not just counter-insurgency, functions across the AES.
  • Al-Shabaab attacks in Lower Shabelle rose roughly 60% in June-August 2026 versus January-May 2026, concentrated on the ground lines of communication into Mogadishu, as AUSSOM accelerated an unplanned handover of responsibility to Somali national forces.
  • The Africa Center for Strategic Studies recorded 9,928 fatalities linked to militant Islamist groups in the Sahel - more than any other African region - while the AES joint counter-terrorism force was expanded from 5,000 to 15,000 troops in mid-April 2026 and AES members confirmed joint airstrikes inside Mali on 1 May 2026.
  • Early Aug 2026: Sudanese army and allied forces repelled two successive RSF assaults at Bir Saliba in a Darfur counteroffensive, the first sustained SAF-aligned gains in the west since El Fasher fell on 26 Oct 2025.
Outlook: Expect continued JNIM economic interdiction of Malian and Burkinabe supply corridors rather than a bid to hold capitals…
Outlook: Expect continued JNIM economic interdiction of Malian and Burkinabe supply corridors rather than a bid to hold capitals, with spillover pressure on Senegalese and Ivorian border zones through Q4 2026. In Sudan, RSF drone reach into Kordofan and toward Port Sudan will likely expand faster than SAF air defence, keeping the war unwinnable for either side and famine conditions entrenched. Somalia is the theatre most likely to deteriorate sharply if AUSSOM financing is not resolved before the end of the year.
Diplomatic & Political
ELEVATED
The Doha/Washington track on eastern DRC is producing procedure rather than peace: two of eight protocols are signed and fighting between FARDC and M23 continues in North and Sout…
The Doha/Washington track on eastern DRC is producing procedure rather than peace: two of eight protocols are signed and fighting between FARDC and M23 continues in North and South Kivu. West Africa has settled into a managed divorce, with the AES bloc outside ECOWAS but borders and visa-free movement largely preserved, and Bamako and Abidjan even agreeing a border delimitation. The Horn carries the highest latent escalation risk, where Ethiopian demands for sovereign Red Sea access and Asmara's ties to anti-Addis armed groups sustain a credible proxy-escalation pathway. Leadership succession risk is rising independently of conflict, most visibly in Cameroon.
  • 17-21 Aug 2026: Five days of DRC-M23 talks in Switzerland, with US, Qatari, Togolese, Swiss and AU …
  • 7 Aug 2026: The Congolese government released 15 detainees under an ICRC-facilitated prisoner excha…
  • 12-13 Aug 2026: The sixth meeting of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism under the DRC-Rwanda…
  • 17-21 Aug 2026: Five days of DRC-M23 talks in Switzerland, with US, Qatari, Togolese, Swiss and AU Commission participation, produced a roadmap of sequenced steps and timelines announced on 23 Aug; only 2 of the 8 Doha framework protocols (ceasefire oversight and detainee liberation) have been signed.
  • 7 Aug 2026: The Congolese government released 15 detainees under an ICRC-facilitated prisoner exchange with M23, the first concrete deliverable of the Doha detainee protocol.
  • 12-13 Aug 2026: The sixth meeting of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism under the DRC-Rwanda peace agreement convened in Geneva with DRC, Rwanda, US, Qatar, Togo and AU representatives.
  • 28 Jul 2026: Kinshasa signed a disarmament, demobilisation and cantonment protocol with the FDLR under the December 2025 Washington Accords; Kigali publicly dismissed it as a delaying tactic and alleged FDLR integration into the FARDC.
  • Sep 2026: The UN Security Council is holding a briefing and consultations on deteriorating eastern DRC security under Resolution 2808 (19 Dec 2025), which restricted MONUSCO to North Kivu and Ituri with South Kivu deployment only for ceasefire monitoring.
  • 20 Aug 2026: Cameroon's President Paul Biya, 93, returned home after a record 73 days in Switzerland with no vice-president appointed, ahead of parliamentary elections scheduled for 20 Dec 2026.
  • Aug 2026: Mali and Cote d'Ivoire - an AES junta and an ECOWAS democracy - agreed the final route of their shared border and aim to sign a formal delimitation treaty before end-2026, indicating pragmatic bilateralism is outpacing bloc-level rupture.
Outlook: The Doha process will most likely continue generating partial protocols without a durable ceasefire, leaving the DRC-Rw…
Outlook: The Doha process will most likely continue generating partial protocols without a durable ceasefire, leaving the DRC-Rwanda file dependent on sustained US and Qatari attention through Q4 2026. Ethiopia-Eritrea escalation remains more likely to manifest as proxy clashes and Tigray-linked instability than as open interstate war within the forecast period. Cameroon's December election and unresolved succession are the most probable source of a new political crisis in Central Africa.
Economic & Trade
ELEVATED
Africa's external trade framework is being rewritten twice over - by the 31 December 2026 expiry of AGOA and by an overlapping US tariff regime that has already stripped most AGOA…
Africa's external trade framework is being rewritten twice over - by the 31 December 2026 expiry of AGOA and by an overlapping US tariff regime that has already stripped most AGOA preference value. Simultaneously, resource nationalism has become the continent's dominant industrial policy: Zimbabwe has banned raw lithium concentrate exports and the DRC is running hard cobalt quotas, deliberately forcing downstream processing onshore. Sovereign balance sheets entered 2026 in better shape after the fastest regional growth in a decade, but 2026 is a peak eurobond repayment year and the September oil spike above $100 is an unhedged shock for net energy importers. AfCFTA implementation is increasingly framed around minerals value chains rather than general tariff liberalisation.
  • AGOA lapsed on 30 Sep 2025 and was reauthorised only retroactively on 3 Feb 2026 for a single year,…
  • From 24 Feb 2026 the US applied Section 122 surcharges of 10% generally - including South Africa (d…
  • 25 Feb 2026: Zimbabwe suspended all raw mineral and lithium concentrate exports with immediate effe…
  • AGOA lapsed on 30 Sep 2025 and was reauthorised only retroactively on 3 Feb 2026 for a single year, so preferences for 32 African beneficiaries now expire on 31 Dec 2026 with no successor framework agreed.
  • From 24 Feb 2026 the US applied Section 122 surcharges of 10% generally - including South Africa (down from 30% reciprocal), Kenya and Eswatini - and 15% on Lesotho, alongside 25% on autos and 50% on steel and aluminium; AGOA-covered exports fell 32% in the year to Nov 2025 and South African vehicle exports to the US collapsed from 25,544 to 6,530 units in 2025.
  • 25 Feb 2026: Zimbabwe suspended all raw mineral and lithium concentrate exports with immediate effect, including cargo in transit, accelerating a ban originally set for Jan 2027; Zimbabwe supplies about 10% of global lithium and shipped 1.128m tonnes of spodumene concentrate to China in 2025, some 15% of Chinese lithium concentrate imports. Export quotas conditioned on local processing commitments were announced on 2 Apr 2026.
  • The DRC set a 2026 cobalt export quota of 96,600 tonnes - 87,000 tonnes pro rata to producers and 9,600 tonnes retained by regulator ARECOMS - plus 18,125 tonnes rolled over from 2025; the DRC supplied 73% of global mined cobalt in 2025 and holds roughly half of world reserves.
  • Apr 2026: The DRC raised $1.25bn in its debut eurobond issue, part of a wider issuance wave of $14bn across sub-Saharan Africa in 2025 and $5.5bn in the first two months of 2026, even as the World Bank flags 2026 as the peak year for regional eurobond repayments.
  • 11 Sep 2026: Oil closed above $100 a barrel for the first time since mid-May and US diesel passed $6 a gallon as the Houthis completed their seizure of Yemen's Red Sea coast - a direct import-bill and inflation shock for Kenya, Ethiopia, Senegal and other net energy importers.
  • Mid-Jan 2026: The US DFC signed a letter of intent for equity investment in DRC state-owned mining assets, following a Dec 2025 Mercuria-Gecamines marketing joint venture and a $553m Lobito Corridor upgrade, formalising a US-China contest over Copperbelt offtake.
Outlook: Without congressional action before 31 December, AGOA lapse plus stacked tariffs will hit South African autos, Lesotho …
Outlook: Without congressional action before 31 December, AGOA lapse plus stacked tariffs will hit South African autos, Lesotho and Kenyan apparel hardest and accelerate diversification toward EU, Gulf and intra-African markets. Expect more African states to copy the Zimbabwe and DRC playbook of export restrictions tied to domestic beneficiation, raising battery-chain input costs globally. Energy-importing sovereigns face the tightest fiscal squeeze since 2022 if Red Sea disruption keeps crude near or above $100 into Q4.
Cyber & Technology
MODERATE
The African threat picture in 2026 is defined less by novel malware than by scale: AI-enabled fraud has industrialised, and critical infrastructure operators with thin security bu…
The African threat picture in 2026 is defined less by novel malware than by scale: AI-enabled fraud has industrialised, and critical infrastructure operators with thin security budgets are now routine ransomware targets. INTERPOL's 2026 assessment quantified the shift, with reported losses more than doubling year on year and AI implicated in over half of cases. State-linked espionage against African IT and telecom infrastructure has also matured, with China-linked actors running the first sustained Africa-focused campaigns and Russia marketing security services to African governments as an access vector. Physical-layer connectivity remains the region's single largest systemic vulnerability, with Red Sea and East African subsea cable cuts repeatedly demonstrating how few independent paths exist.
  • 3 Sep 2026: Rand Water, South Africa's largest bulk water utility supplying Gauteng and neighbourin…
  • 4 Aug 2026: INTERPOL's African Cyberthreat Assessment Report 2026, drawing on data from 36 countrie…
  • Operation Serengeti 2.0 (June-August 2025, 18 African countries plus the UK) produced 1,209 arrests…
  • 3 Sep 2026: Rand Water, South Africa's largest bulk water utility supplying Gauteng and neighbouring provinces, disclosed a cybersecurity incident affecting IT systems; the utility stated water treatment, quality control and bulk supply operations were unaffected.
  • 4 Aug 2026: INTERPOL's African Cyberthreat Assessment Report 2026, drawing on data from 36 countries, found AI involved in 55% of reported cybercrime and reported losses rising from $192m in 2024 to $484m in 2025, with 72% of surveyed states hosting scam centres and roughly 600,000 deepfake-linked sextortion cases detected.
  • Operation Serengeti 2.0 (June-August 2025, 18 African countries plus the UK) produced 1,209 arrests, $97.4m seized and 11,432 malicious infrastructures dismantled across 87,858 victims, including 25 illicit crypto-mining centres worth over $37m in Angola and a Zambian investment fraud affecting about 65,000 victims with losses above $300m.
  • The Development Bank of Southern Africa, a state-owned lender, confirmed an Akira ransomware intrusion - part of a documented East and Southern African pattern of ransomware aimed at financial and infrastructure operators rather than consumer targets.
  • 6 Sep 2025: Simultaneous cuts to the SMW4, IMEWE, FALCON GCX and Europe India Gateway systems in the Red Sea - attributed to commercial shipping anchor drag - degraded connectivity across Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Pakistan, India and parts of East Africa, forcing Microsoft to reroute Azure traffic; the anniversary underscores an unmitigated chokepoint now overlaid by active Houthi control of Bab al-Mandeb.
  • China-linked APT41 has run a targeted espionage campaign against African government IT infrastructure - the group's first significant Africa-focused activity - while Iran-linked MuddyWater has operated campaigns spanning the Middle East, Turkey and Africa.
  • The May 2024 SEACOM and EASSy cuts off KwaZulu-Natal, which degraded connectivity in Burundi, Malawi, Mozambique, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda and took about three weeks to fully repair, remains the benchmark for East African single-path dependency on South African cloud landing points.
Outlook: Ransomware against utilities, health services and state-owned financial institutions will continue to rise faster than …
Outlook: Ransomware against utilities, health services and state-owned financial institutions will continue to rise faster than African incident-response capacity, with South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria the most exposed. AI-enabled BEC and investment fraud will keep loss figures compounding into 2027 despite further INTERPOL-coordinated takedowns. Subsea cable resilience is the highest-value structural mitigation available and the least likely to be funded at pace.
Maritime & Territorial
CRITICAL
The Western Indian Ocean and Red Sea have entered the most severe maritime security environment in over a decade. Houthi forces completed the seizure of Yemen's entire Red Sea coa…
The Western Indian Ocean and Red Sea have entered the most severe maritime security environment in over a decade. Houthi forces completed the seizure of Yemen's entire Red Sea coastline and the islands commanding Bab al-Mandeb on 10-11 September, converting an interdiction campaign into territorial control of a chokepoint that carries Europe-Asia container traffic and Saudi crude routed away from Hormuz. Somali piracy has simultaneously reactivated to a ten-year high, exploiting naval attention diverted to the Red Sea and Gulf conflict. Port geopolitics is realigning in parallel, with Djibouti's arbitration victory over DP World, new Saudi terminal investment at Tadjourah, and Ethiopia's unresolved demand for sovereign sea access all reshaping Horn of Africa access.
  • 10-11 Sep 2026: Houthi forces seized the whole of Yemen's Red Sea coast including Mocha, Dhubab, th…
  • 11 Sep 2026: Oil closed above $100 a barrel for the first time since mid-May and US diesel exceeded…
  • 12 Aug 2026: Six people were killed in a Houthi attack on a vessel in the Bab al-Mandeb strait, acc…
  • 10-11 Sep 2026: Houthi forces seized the whole of Yemen's Red Sea coast including Mocha, Dhubab, the al-Omari camp overlooking the strait and Mayyun (Perim) Island after government forces withdrew; spokesman Yahya Saree claimed six districts covering 5,400 sq km, giving the Houthis dominance over Bab al-Mandeb.
  • 11 Sep 2026: Oil closed above $100 a barrel for the first time since mid-May and US diesel exceeded $6 a gallon on the news; Saudi airstrikes were reported against Mocha airport and Oman was reported convening Gulf states on reopening the Strait of Hormuz.
  • 12 Aug 2026: Six people were killed in a Houthi attack on a vessel in the Bab al-Mandeb strait, according to Yemen's government; on 22 Jul 2026 a combined naval task force reported Houthi missile and drone deployments for attacks on shipping in the southern Red Sea.
  • Somali piracy reached a ten-year high with at least 15 attacks recorded in 2026 against 5 in all of 2025, including 8 in the Gulf of Aden since May; the 90-metre tanker Honour 25 was hijacked on 21 Apr 2026 north of Eyl, Puntland, by around 30 pirates armed with assault rifles and grenade launchers, with 17 crew taken hostage.
  • 7-9 Sep 2026: A Djibouti Code of Conduct working-group workshop in Mombasa was tasked with building the operational framework for a new joint regional maritime force for the Western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden, with composition, assets and troop numbers still undecided.
  • Djibouti won its long-running arbitration against DP World over the Doraleh Container Terminal, ending seven years of litigation over the 2018 contract termination; Doraleh handled 1,236,769 TEU in 2024, its first year above 1m TEU, while Saudi-backed Red Sea Gateway Terminal is investing $180m in Tadjourah under a 30-year concession starting in 2026.
  • Ethiopia continues to press for sovereign Red Sea access, with Abiy Ahmed publicly framing the loss of coastline as an error to be corrected and Assab as the objective, while DP World backs alternative Bab al-Mandeb-adjacent ports at Berbera and Assab to dilute Djibouti's transit monopoly.
Outlook: With both Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb contested simultaneously, expect sustained Cape of Good Hope rerouting, sharply high…
Outlook: With both Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb contested simultaneously, expect sustained Cape of Good Hope rerouting, sharply higher war-risk premiums and further upward pressure on East African import costs through Q4 2026. Somali piracy will likely keep escalating while naval assets remain concentrated in the Red Sea and Gulf, with additional hijackings of slow, low-freeboard vessels in the Somali Basin highly likely. Djiboutian transit volumes and Ethiopian sea-access diplomacy are the variables most likely to produce a new Horn of Africa flashpoint.
EU Cooperation & Investment Portfolio 58 projects · EUR 31,113M · trade agreements in EU Global
★ EU
EU Cooperation & Investment Portfolio
Africa & Indian Ocean — Active programmes, partnerships & trade agreements
EUR 31,113M
Total Investment
58
Projects & Programmes
29
Countries Covered
53
Active
Top Sectors by Investment
Energy & Green Transition 6 EUR 13,911M
Infrastructure & Transport 6 EUR 10,667M
Governance & Rule of Law 6 EUR 2,395M
Agriculture & Food 3 EUR 929M
Humanitarian 1 EUR 896M
Flagship Projects
South Africa — Just Energy Transition Partnership
EUR 12,000M 2021–2027 ACTIVE
Egypt — Strategic Partnership Package 2024-2027
EUR 7,400M 2024–2027 ACTIVE
Lobito Corridor — Global Gateway Flagship
EUR 2,000M 2023–2027 ACTIVE
Active (53) Completed (4) Planned (1)