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Policy Briefing

EU–Asia Relations Briefing — March 15, 2026

Published March 15, 2026 — 06:02 UTC

EU–Asia Relations Briefing — March 15, 2026

Automated policy briefing on EU–Asia Pacific relations generated with AI-powered web search.

Political Relations & Strategic Rivalry

Executive Summary

In the last 48 hours, there have been no reported EU-China summits or new EU sanctions specifically targeting Chinese entities linked to Russia's military-industrial complex. However, the European Union has extended its Operation Aspides maritime security mission to the Strait of Hormuz and Arabian Sea, a development that indirectly touches upon regional security dynamics where Chinese shipping interests are also present. The broader "de-risking" strategy continues to shape diplomatic engagement, with ongoing efforts to reduce critical dependencies while maintaining dialogue on global challenges.

EU Institutional Actions

  • European External Action Service (EEAS): On March 13, 2026, the EU extended its Operation Aspides maritime security mission to include the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Sea, aiming to safeguard freedom of navigation. This expansion addresses heightened risks in the region, including interference with navigation systems and ships "going dark."

Key Bilateral Developments

  • EU-China: No major bilateral summits or high-level dialogues have been reported within the last 48 hours. The last EU-China summit took place in July 2025, which concluded without significant progress on key issues such as Ukraine, trade, or market access.
  • EU-China (Sanctions Context): No new EU sanctions on Chinese entities linked to Russia's military-industrial complex have been announced in the past 48 hours. Previous EU sanctions packages, including the 13th (February 2024) and 15th (December 2024) packages, have targeted Chinese and Hong Kong entities for supporting Russia's military efforts, imposing export controls on dual-use goods and advanced technologies. A proposal in November 2024 also aimed to introduce asset freezes and visa bans on Chinese companies and individuals for aiding Russia.

Sector Analysis

Trade/Investment: No major developments in the last 48 hours. The EU continues to express concerns regarding systemic imbalances in the Chinese economy, including distortive industrial policies, overcapacity, and export controls on critical raw materials and technologies, which negatively impact EU supply chains.
Defence/Security: The EU's extension of Operation Aspides on March 13, 2026, to the Strait of Hormuz and Arabian Sea is a significant development, responding to increased maritime security risks. This region has seen incidents like GPS jamming and ships disabling their identification systems, with Iran reportedly permitting Chinese ships to transit the Strait, and some vessels attempting to identify as Chinese.
Technology/Digital: No major developments in the last 48 hours. Recent EU actions include a ban on Chinese organizations from applying for Horizon Europe grants in "critical areas" like AI, quantum technologies, and semiconductors, effective February 21, 2026, due to research security concerns. China has previously voiced strong opposition to the EU's plans to label certain Chinese companies as "high-risk suppliers" and restrict their participation in 5G development, citing discriminatory practices.
Climate/Energy: No major developments in the last 48 hours. The EU and China have previously engaged in cooperation on climate change, including a joint statement at the July 2025 summit, emphasizing shared responsibility to uphold the Paris Agreement.

Implications for Analysts

  • For Europe: Analysts should monitor the practical implementation and effectiveness of the extended Operation Aspides, particularly how it navigates the complex maritime environment involving various state and non-state actors, and any potential implications for EU-China interactions in critical waterways.
  • For Asia: Analysts should observe China's response to the evolving maritime security landscape in the Strait of Hormuz and Arabian Sea, especially concerning the protection of its shipping interests and its diplomatic engagement with regional and European naval presences.

Outlook

Strained
The absence of recent high-level dialogues or progress on contentious issues, coupled with ongoing concerns over China's stance on Russia and EU actions in maritime security and technology, indicates continued strain in EU-China political relations.

Economic Relations, Trade & Investment

Executive Summary

The European Union has recently intensified its trade defense posture towards Asia, implementing definitive anti-dumping duties on acrylonitrile-butadiene-styrene (ABS) resins from South Korea and Taiwan, effective February 12, 2026. Concurrently, the EU has imposed additional tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles (EVs) but has also granted a specific tariff exemption for Volkswagen's China-manufactured Cupra Tavascan electric SUV, signaling a nuanced approach to trade disputes. The EU-Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), while signed, continues to await ratification, highlighting ongoing complexities in deepening broader trade ties.

EU Institutional Actions

  • European Commission: On February 12, 2026, the European Commission imposed additional tariffs on electric vehicles imported from China, building on existing duties.
  • European Commission: On February 12, 2026, the European Commission approved a tariff exemption for Volkswagen's China-manufactured Cupra Tavascan electric SUV, contingent on the automaker agreeing to a minimum price and annual sales quota.
  • European Commission: Effective February 12, 2026, the European Commission imposed definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of acrylonitrile-butadiene-styrene (ABS) resins from Taiwan and the Republic of Korea. These tariffs range from 5.2% to 7.5% for South Korean products and from 10.9% to 21.7% for Taiwanese products.

Key Bilateral Developments

  • EU-China: The EU has implemented additional tariffs on Chinese-made electric vehicles, reflecting an ongoing trade dispute over alleged unfair subsidies. However, a notable development is the tariff exemption granted to Volkswagen's Cupra Tavascan EV, manufactured in China, under specific conditions.
  • EU-South Korea: Definitive anti-dumping duties ranging from 5.2% to 7.5% have been imposed on imports of ABS resins from South Korea, effective February 12, 2026. This follows an investigation that found ABS from South Korea was being sold at dumped prices, causing injury to EU manufacturers.
  • EU-Taiwan: Definitive anti-dumping duties, ranging from 10.9% to 21.7%, were imposed on imports of ABS resins from Taiwan, effective February 12, 2026. The investigation concluded that dumped imports from Taiwan were harming the EU plastics industry.
  • EU-Indonesia: The Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between the EU and Indonesia, while signed, is still undergoing legal processes and awaits lawmakers' approval before its targeted entry into force in early 2027.
  • EU-ASEAN: The EU Ambassador to ASEAN indicated on January 27, 2026, that negotiations are underway for bilateral trade pacts with Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia, with a goal to finalize these by 2027. A regional trade agreement with ASEAN is considered a long-term objective to be reviewed after 2027.

Sector Analysis

Trade/Investment: The imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties on ABS from South Korea and Taiwan, alongside additional tariffs on Chinese EVs, signals a more assertive EU stance on trade defense to protect domestic industries from unfair competition. The conditional tariff exemption for a Chinese-made EV from a European automaker suggests a pragmatic approach to managing complex trade relationships.
Defence/Security: No major developments.
Technology/Digital: The anti-dumping duties on ABS, a key plastic used in electronics, directly impact the supply chain for high-tech components from South Korea and Taiwan.
Climate/Energy: The tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles are linked to concerns over state subsidies, impacting the green transition sector and the competitiveness of European EV producers.

Implications for Analysts

  • For Europe: Analysts should monitor the EU's evolving trade defense strategy, noting the balance between protectionist measures and selective engagement, as seen with the EV tariffs and exemptions, which could set precedents for future trade disputes.
  • For Asia: Analysts should assess the potential for trade diversion and market shifts in response to the new EU anti-dumping duties on ABS, particularly for South Korean and Taiwanese exporters, and observe how China responds to the nuanced EV tariffs.

Outlook

Strained
The recent imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties and additional tariffs, despite some specific exemptions, indicates a continued and in some areas intensified, strained relationship in economic and trade matters between the EU and key Asian partners.

Digital Policies & Innovation

Executive Summary

No significant new developments concerning EU-Asia digital partnerships, the implementation of the EU-Singapore Digital Trade Agreement, or new joint research projects under Horizon Europe involving South Korea or Japan in areas like AI, 6G, or semiconductors have been reported within the last 48 hours. The EU-Singapore Digital Trade Agreement officially entered into force on February 1, 2026, establishing a framework for digital trade between the two economies.

EU Institutional Actions

No major institutional actions by EU institutions related to EU-Asia digital partnerships have been reported in the last 48 hours.

Key Bilateral Developments

  • EU-Singapore: The EU-Singapore Digital Trade Agreement (DTA) entered into force on February 1, 2026. This agreement aims to facilitate cross-border digital business processes, create a common framework for electronic data and service exchange, and provide legal certainty for businesses. Key provisions include commitments on online consumer protection, personal data protection, and the recognition of electronic contracts and signatures.
  • EU-Japan: No major developments in joint research projects under Horizon Europe in areas like AI, 6G, or semiconductors have been reported in the last 48 hours. Previous commitments include the 6G MIRAI-HARMONY joint research project and continued joint research on semiconductors, agreed upon during the third Digital Partnership Council on May 12, 2025. Japan also agreed to join Horizon Europe, with the deal to be officially signed in 2026, allowing Japanese researchers to apply for calls starting January 2026.
  • EU-South Korea: No major developments in new joint research projects under Horizon Europe in areas like AI, 6G, or semiconductors have been reported in the last 48 hours. The EU and South Korea reinforced cooperation on emerging technologies during their third Digital Partnership Council on November 28, 2025. A joint call for research on heterogeneous integration and neuromorphic computing technologies for semiconductors was launched in February 2024, with four projects selected in July 2024.

Sector Analysis

Trade/Investment: The EU-Singapore Digital Trade Agreement, in force since February 1, 2026, prohibits customs duties on electronic transmissions and unjustified data localization requirements, aiming to boost digital trade and investment flows between the EU and Singapore.
Defence/Security: No major developments.
Technology/Digital: While no new joint research projects were announced in the last 48 hours, existing EU digital partnerships with Japan and South Korea continue to focus on collaboration in semiconductors, AI, and 6G, with ongoing projects and frameworks established in late 2025 and early 2026.
Climate/Energy: No major developments.

Implications for Analysts

  • For Europe: Analysts should note the continued focus on the implementation of existing digital trade agreements and research partnerships, rather than new initiatives, in the immediate term.
  • For Asia: Analysts monitoring Asia-Pacific dynamics should observe the long-term impacts of the EU-Singapore DTA on digital trade practices and the sustained, albeit not newly announced, research collaborations with Japan and South Korea in critical technology sectors.

Outlook

Stable
Justification: The absence of new major announcements within the last 48 hours suggests a period of stable implementation and ongoing work within established digital partnership frameworks, rather than significant shifts or new initiatives.

Security & Maritime Cooperation

Executive Summary

No major new developments regarding EU security engagement in the Indo-Pacific, specifically concerning new maritime surveillance agreements with ASEAN members or joint naval exercises, have been reported within the last 48 hours. Similarly, no new statements from the EU regarding stability in the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait have been issued in this period. The EU's established position continues to advocate for a rules-based international order, freedom of navigation, and peaceful resolution of disputes in these critical maritime areas.

EU Institutional Actions

No major institutional actions by the European Commission, EEAS, Council, or European Parliament concerning new maritime surveillance agreements with ASEAN members, joint naval exercises, or new statements on the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait have been reported in the last 48 hours.

Key Bilateral Developments

No major bilateral developments concerning new maritime surveillance agreements or joint naval exercises between the EU and specific Indo-Pacific countries or regional blocs (e.g., ASEAN) have been reported in the last 48 hours.

Sector Analysis

Trade/Investment: No major developments in tariffs, FTAs, investment flows, or sanctions related to EU-Asia security engagement have been reported in the last 48 hours.
Defence/Security: No new military cooperation initiatives or joint naval exercises in the Indo-Pacific involving the EU have been reported in the last 48 hours. The EU has previously conducted joint naval exercises with the United States in March 2023 and with India in June 2025, focusing on counter-piracy operations and interoperability. The EU has consistently expressed concern over escalating tensions in the South China Sea, condemning dangerous actions by the Chinese Coast Guard against Philippine vessels in December 2025 and September 2024.
Technology/Digital: No major developments in semiconductors, AI, cyber, or digital trade directly related to EU security engagement in the Indo-Pacific have been reported in the last 48 hours.
Climate/Energy: No major developments concerning CBAM, green partnerships, or critical raw materials directly related to EU security engagement in the Indo-Pacific have been reported in the last 48 hours.

Implications for Analysts

  • For Europe: Analysts monitoring EU policy should note the absence of immediate new security initiatives in the Indo-Pacific, suggesting a period of continuity in existing policy frameworks rather than new departures. The focus remains on upholding international law and freedom of navigation, as previously articulated.
  • For Asia: Analysts monitoring Asia-Pacific dynamics should recognize that while the EU maintains a strategic interest in regional stability, there have been no new EU actions in the last 48 hours that would significantly alter the current security landscape or power dynamics in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait.

Outlook

Stable
The current outlook for EU security engagement in the Indo-Pacific is stable, reflecting a continuation of established policy positions and a lack of new, immediate developments in the last 48 hours.

Environment, Energy & Critical Raw Materials

Executive Summary

The EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) has entered its definitive phase in 2026, imposing real carbon compliance costs on East Asian manufacturers, particularly in China's steel and aluminum sectors, and raising potential future costs for South Korea's technology industries. Concurrently, the EU is actively pursuing critical raw material diversification through initiatives like the RESourceEU Action Plan and advancing green energy cooperation with partners such as Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam, aiming to reduce strategic dependencies and foster sustainable transitions across Asia. These developments signal a deepening of the EU's climate and economic security agenda in its relations with Asia.

EU Institutional Actions

  • European Commission: Adopted the RESourceEU Action Plan on December 3, 2025, committing up to €3 billion for 2026 to accelerate critical raw material projects and diversify supply chains, with the first matchmaking round scheduled for March 2026. It also plans to introduce export restrictions on permanent magnet and aluminum scrap in early 2026 to boost recycling capacity.
  • European External Action Service (EEAS): The EU Delegation to South Korea will host an expert seminar on March 25, 2026, in Seoul, focusing on the reduction and management of fluorinated gases (F-gases) under the EU-Korea Green Partnership Programme.
  • EU-Japan Centre for Industrial Cooperation: Relaunched an online B2B matchmaking event for green transition sectors, active until March 2026, to foster partnerships between European and Japanese entities in areas like hydrogen, batteries, and solar technologies. It is also organizing a Green Business Mission to Japan from March 16-19, 2026, for EU SMEs to exhibit at the "Tokyo Decarbonisation Expo".

Key Bilateral Developments

  • EU-China: As of January 1, 2026, China-based manufacturers in CBAM-covered sectors like steel and aluminum are accruing real carbon compliance costs, with certificate purchases commencing in February 2027. This is expected to reconfigure cost competitiveness for heavy industrial exporters.
  • EU-South Korea: The EU's CBAM tariffs began on January 1, 2026, impacting South Korean industries. The potential future inclusion of semiconductors and liquefied natural gas (LNG) in CBAM could lead to estimated certificate costs of USD 588 million between 2026 and 2034, potentially shifting European buyers towards lower-carbon suppliers.
  • EU-Indonesia: An EU-Indonesia trade agreement (IEU-CEPA) is anticipated for implementation from January 1, 2027, aiming to reduce tariffs, strengthen supply chains, and secure EU access to critical raw materials such as cobalt, copper, and tin, while also opening investment opportunities in Indonesia's electric vehicle sector. However, civil society groups have expressed concerns regarding the agreement's impact on Indonesia's ability to develop its own raw material value chains and potential environmental threats.
  • EU-Vietnam: On December 31, 2025 (reported January 4, 2026), Vietnam and the EU signed a €50 million financing agreement for the Vietnam-EU Vocational Education and Training (VETVET) program, integrating green technology and renewable energy into the curriculum to support Vietnam's green and digital transitions. The EU-Vietnam Sustainable Energy Transition Programme (SETP) continues to advance sustainable energy development.

Sector Analysis

Trade/Investment: The definitive phase of CBAM in 2026 is introducing carbon compliance costs for East Asian exporters of carbon-intensive goods to the EU, potentially reshaping global supply chains and trade competitiveness, particularly for China, South Korea, and Vietnam. The impending EU-Indonesia CEPA aims to reduce tariffs and secure critical raw material access for the EU.
Defence/Security: No major developments in the last 48 hours.
Technology/Digital: The EU-Korea Green Partnership Programme is facilitating technical exchange on F-gas reduction, relevant to the semiconductor industry. The EU-Japan Centre is promoting B2B matchmaking for green technologies, including batteries and smart grids.
Climate/Energy: CBAM is now fully operational, requiring importers to verify emissions data and purchase certificates, influencing East Asian manufacturers to adopt greener production. The EU is actively diversifying critical raw material supply chains through the RESourceEU Action Plan and partnerships with Southeast Asian nations like Indonesia. Green energy cooperation is advancing with Japan through B2B matchmaking and missions, and with South Korea via a seminar on F-gases, while Vietnam benefits from a €50 million deal for green workforce development.

Implications for Analysts

  • For Europe: Analysts should monitor the practical implementation and economic impact of CBAM on EU import prices and the competitiveness of European industries, as well as the effectiveness of RESourceEU in diversifying critical raw material supply chains away from China, given past challenges in import diversification.
  • For Asia: Analysts should assess how East Asian economies, particularly China, South Korea, and Vietnam, adapt their industrial policies and manufacturing processes to mitigate CBAM costs and leverage green transition opportunities, including the development of green industrial parks and domestic carbon pricing mechanisms.

Outlook

Deepening
The EU's proactive implementation of CBAM and strategic initiatives like RESourceEU, coupled with targeted green energy and raw material partnerships across Asia, indicates a deepening of its climate and economic security agenda, fostering both challenges and opportunities for enhanced cooperation and diversification.

Sources

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