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Policy Briefing

EU–Asia Relations Briefing — February 17, 2026

Published February 17, 2026 — 09:01 UTC

EU–Asia Relations Briefing — February 17, 2026

Automated policy briefing on EU–Asia Pacific relations generated with AI-powered web search.


Political Relations & Strategic Rivalry

Executive Summary

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, speaking at the Munich Security Conference on February 15, 2026, emphasized that China and Europe are partners, not adversaries or "systemic rivals," urging a rational and pragmatic approach to bilateral relations. This high-level diplomatic engagement underscores Beijing's efforts to shape the narrative around the EU's "de-risking" strategy, while no new EU sanctions on Chinese entities linked to Russia's military-industrial complex have been announced in the last 48 hours.

EU Institutional Actions

No major institutional actions by EU bodies (European Commission, EEAS, Council, European Parliament) specifically concerning EU-China relations have been reported in the last 48 hours.

Key Bilateral Developments

  • EU-China: On February 15, 2026, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, during the "China in the World" session of the Munich Security Conference, stated that China and Europe are partners, not opponents or "systemic rivals." He highlighted half a century of engagement and daily trade exceeding 2 billion U.S. dollars as proof of this partnership, cautioning against exaggerating differences.
  • EU-China: On the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference on February 14, 2026, Wang Yi met with French and German counterparts, telling them that Beijing was not to blame for Europe's economic and security problems and pushing for more cooperation. He urged Europe to pursue a "rational and pragmatic policy toward China," emphasizing that "the two sides are partners, not adversaries; interdependence is not a risk; intertwined interests are not a threat; and open cooperation will not harm security."

Sector Analysis

Trade/Investment: Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's recent statements at the Munich Security Conference on February 15, 2026, underscored the depth of China-Europe partnership, citing daily trade exceeding 2 billion U.S. dollars. There have been no new developments regarding tariffs, free trade agreements, or investment flows in the last 48 hours.
Defence/Security: No major developments regarding military cooperation or maritime security in EU-China relations have been reported in the last 48 hours.
Technology/Digital: No major developments concerning semiconductors, AI, cyber, or digital trade in EU-China relations have been reported in the last 48 hours.
Climate/Energy: No major developments regarding CBAM, green partnerships, or critical raw materials in EU-China relations have been reported in the last 48 hours.

Implications for Analysts

  • For Europe: Analysts should note China's continued diplomatic push to reframe the "systemic rival" narrative, suggesting Beijing aims to mitigate the more confrontational aspects of the EU's de-risking strategy through high-level engagement and emphasis on shared economic interests.
  • For Asia: Analysts monitoring Asia-Pacific dynamics should observe how China's proactive diplomatic messaging, particularly at multilateral forums like the Munich Security Conference, seeks to influence European perceptions and potentially create divisions within the EU's approach to its "de-risking" policy.

Outlook

Strained
Chinese diplomatic efforts to soften the "systemic rival" label are ongoing, but the underlying structural tensions and the EU's existing de-risking framework, coupled with past sanctions on Chinese entities, indicate a continued strained relationship.


Economic Relations, Trade & Investment

Executive Summary

The European Union has recently intensified its trade defense posture, notably by imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on acrylonitrile-butadiene-styrene (ABS) resins from South Korea and Taiwan. Concurrently, the EU continues to advance its trade agenda in Asia, with the EU-Singapore Digital Trade Agreement entering into force and ongoing efforts to finalize new free trade agreements with several ASEAN nations, indicating a dual strategy of protecting domestic industries while deepening broader economic engagement.

EU Institutional Actions

  • European Commission: On February 13, 2026, imposed definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of acrylonitrile-butadiene-styrene (ABS) resins from Taiwan and the Republic of Korea, following an in-depth investigation into dumped prices causing injury to EU manufacturers.
  • European Commission: On February 13, 2026, imposed anti-dumping duties on imports of valine from the People's Republic of China.
  • European Commission: On February 12, 2026, requested a WTO panel in its dispute with China concerning unfair and illegal trade practices that curb the intellectual property rights of EU companies.

Key Bilateral Developments

  • EU-South Korea: On February 13, 2026, the EU imposed definitive anti-dumping duties on ABS resins from South Korea, with rates ranging from 5.2% to 7.5% for various producers.
  • EU-Taiwan: On February 13, 2026, the EU imposed definitive anti-dumping duties on ABS resins from Taiwan, with rates ranging from 10.9% to 21.7% for various producers.
  • EU-China: On February 10, 2026, the Commission accepted an undertaking from a Chinese exporter of battery electric vehicles (BEVs). This follows the adoption of definitive countervailing duties on Chinese BEVs, applicable since October 30, 2024, ranging from 17.0% to 35.3% due to unfair government subsidies.
  • EU-Singapore: The EU-Singapore Digital Trade Agreement (DTA) officially entered into force on February 1, 2026.
  • EU-Indonesia: Negotiations for the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) were finalized and signed on September 23, 2025, with the agreement expected to take effect in early 2027 following ratification processes.

Sector Analysis

Trade/Investment: The EU has implemented new definitive anti-dumping duties on ABS resins from South Korea and Taiwan, indicating a continued focus on protecting specific EU industries from unfairly priced imports. The EU-Indonesia CEPA, once ratified, is set to eliminate tariffs on a significant portion of goods, fostering increased bilateral trade and investment flows.
Defence/Security: No major developments.
Technology/Digital: The entry into force of the EU-Singapore Digital Trade Agreement on February 1, 2026, marks a step towards facilitating digital trade and cooperation in the technology sector. The EU also initiated a WTO dispute with China over intellectual property rights in the high-tech sector.
Climate/Energy: No major developments.

Implications for Analysts

  • For Europe: Analysts should monitor the effectiveness of the new anti-dumping duties in protecting EU industries and the potential for retaliatory measures, particularly from China, given the ongoing trade defense actions and WTO dispute.
  • For Asia: Analysts should observe how Asian economies, particularly South Korea and Taiwan, adapt to the new EU trade defense measures on ABS, potentially redirecting trade flows, and the broader impact of the EU's expanding network of trade agreements with ASEAN nations.

Outlook

Strained
The recent imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties on high-tech components from South Korea and Taiwan, alongside ongoing trade defense measures and a WTO dispute with China, indicates a period of increased trade friction, despite progress on broader trade agreements with other Asian partners.


Digital Policies & Innovation

Executive Summary

The most significant development in EU-Asia digital partnerships in the last 48 hours is the entry into force of the EU-Singapore Digital Trade Agreement (DTA) on February 1, 2026. This landmark agreement, the EU's first standalone bilateral digital trade pact, aims to streamline cross-border digital transactions and establish high standards for digital trade, setting a precedent for future digital policy engagements in the region.

EU Institutional Actions

  • European Commission: The EU-Singapore Digital Trade Agreement (DTA), negotiated by the European Commission, officially entered into force on February 1, 2026. This agreement is designed to facilitate cross-border digital transactions, enhance consumer trust, and provide legal certainty for businesses by addressing unjustified barriers to digital trade.

Key Bilateral Developments

  • EU-Singapore: The EU-Singapore Digital Trade Agreement (DTA) became effective on February 1, 2026. This agreement, signed on May 7, 2025, and concluded in July 2024, is a foundational step in shaping digital and data rules centered on people and their rights, while ensuring both parties retain policy space for emerging digital economy challenges. It includes provisions for paperless trade, validity of electronic signatures and contracts, and prohibits customs duties on electronic transmissions, unjustified data localization requirements, and forced transfers of software source code.

Sector Analysis

Trade/Investment: The entry into force of the EU-Singapore Digital Trade Agreement (DTA) on February 1, 2026, is expected to boost digital trade by establishing transparent rules, ensuring legal certainty for businesses, and enhancing consumer trust in cross-border digital transactions. The DTA prohibits customs duties on electronic transmissions and addresses protectionist practices like unjustified data localization requirements and forced transfers of source code.
Defence/Security: No major developments.
Technology/Digital: The EU-Singapore DTA's implementation will foster a safer online environment through commitments on online consumer protection, personal data and privacy, and protection against unsolicited commercial messages. While there are ongoing EU-Japan and EU-South Korea digital partnerships covering areas like AI, 6G, and semiconductors, no new joint research projects under Horizon Europe involving these countries have been announced in the last 48 hours.
Climate/Energy: No major developments.

Implications for Analysts

  • For Europe: Analysts should monitor the practical implementation and impact of the EU-Singapore DTA as a blueprint for future EU digital trade agreements and partnerships in Asia, particularly concerning data governance and digital sovereignty.
  • For Asia: Analysts should observe how the EU-Singapore DTA influences digital policy discussions and potential future digital trade agreements between the EU and other ASEAN nations, especially regarding standards for data flows and digital market access.

Outlook

Deepening
The operationalization of the EU-Singapore Digital Trade Agreement signifies a concrete step towards deepening digital cooperation and setting international standards for digital trade between the EU and Asia.


Security & Maritime Cooperation

Executive Summary

No major new security or maritime cooperation developments between the EU and Indo-Pacific partners, nor new statements regarding the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait, have been reported within the last 48 hours. The European Union's engagement in the Indo-Pacific continues to be guided by its 2021 strategy, focusing on upholding a rules-based international order and promoting regional stability.

EU Institutional Actions

  • No major institutional actions in this period.

Key Bilateral Developments

  • No major bilateral developments in this period.

Sector Analysis

Trade/Investment: No major developments.
Defence/Security: No major developments.
Technology/Digital: No major developments.
Climate/Energy: No major developments.

Implications for Analysts

  • For Europe: Analysts monitoring EU policy should note the absence of new, immediate security engagements or statements in the Indo-Pacific within this narrow timeframe, suggesting a period of consolidation or focus on existing initiatives.
  • For Asia: Analysts monitoring Asia-Pacific dynamics should recognize that while the EU maintains a strategic interest in the region, no new EU-led security initiatives or direct interventions have emerged in the last 48 hours.

Outlook

Stable
The absence of reported new developments within the last 48 hours indicates a stable period in EU security engagement in the Indo-Pacific, with no immediate shifts in policy or activity.


Environment, Energy & Critical Raw Materials

Executive Summary

The European Court of Auditors (ECA) has recently reported that the EU's ambitious 2030 targets for diversifying critical raw material imports are "out of reach," indicating a continued reliance on a limited number of suppliers, including China. Concurrently, the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), now in its definitive phase, is prompting East Asian economies like Taiwan to accelerate domestic carbon pricing and decarbonization efforts, while South Korean technology industries face significant potential costs. These developments highlight the EU's struggle for strategic autonomy in raw materials amidst its push for global decarbonization through trade mechanisms, leading to a complex and somewhat strained dynamic in EU-Asia relations.

EU Institutional Actions

  • European Court of Auditors (ECA): On February 16, 2026, the ECA released a report stating that the EU's 2030 targets for critical minerals are "out of reach" and efforts to diversify imports have "yet to produce tangible results," indicating continued reliance on a limited number of countries, including China, Turkey, and Chile.
  • European Commission: On February 13, 2026, the Commission published default values and benchmarks for the definitive period of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which became financially operational on January 1, 2026.

Key Bilateral Developments

  • EU-South Korea: An Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) report from February 12, 2026, highlighted that the EU's CBAM poses significant supply chain carbon risks for South Korean technology industries, particularly if semiconductors and liquefied natural gas (LNG) are included. CBAM certificate costs for South Korean chip exporters could reach an estimated USD 588 million between 2026 and 2034 under a high EU ETS price scenario, potentially prompting European buyers to seek lower-carbon alternatives.
  • EU-Taiwan: On February 16, 2026, Taiwan's Ministry of Environment identified 234 enterprises meeting high-carbon leakage risk criteria across 17 industries. Reviews are set to be completed by the end of April to enable carbon fee payments in May, with approved voluntary reduction plans publicly disclosed by the end of February.
  • EU-Vietnam: On February 16, 2026, it was reported that Vietnam will complete and publish provincial forest boundary databases and maps by the end of 2026 as part of an action plan to implement the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR).
  • EU-Indonesia: On February 16, 2026, Indonesia was reported to be stepping up efforts to embed blue carbon into its climate strategy ahead of COP31.

Sector Analysis

Trade/Investment: The EU's CBAM, now in its definitive phase, is imposing financial obligations on imports, compelling East Asian manufacturers to assess and adapt their carbon pricing and production processes to maintain competitiveness in the EU market. The potential expansion of CBAM to downstream products could further impact trade flows from countries like China, Japan, and South Korea.
Defence/Security: No major developments.
Technology/Digital: South Korean technology industries, particularly semiconductors, face rising carbon-related costs due to CBAM, which could influence European procurement decisions and accelerate shifts towards lower-carbon suppliers.
Climate/Energy: The EU's efforts to diversify critical raw material supply chains away from China are currently falling short of their 2030 targets, as highlighted by a recent audit. Meanwhile, China is emerging as an exporter of hydrogen-based low-carbon steel to Europe, indicating shifts in green industrial capabilities.

Implications for Analysts

  • For Europe: Analysts should closely monitor the EU's internal capacity to meet critical raw material targets and the effectiveness of its diversification partnerships, as current trends suggest persistent vulnerabilities despite policy ambitions.
  • For Asia: Analysts should observe how East Asian economies, particularly South Korea and Taiwan, adapt their domestic carbon pricing and industrial decarbonization strategies in response to CBAM, as this will shape their trade competitiveness with the EU.

Outlook

Strained
The EU's critical raw material diversification efforts are currently failing, maintaining strategic dependencies, while its CBAM is creating immediate cost pressures and regulatory adjustments for East Asian manufacturers, leading to some trade friction and a push for domestic decarbonization.


Sources