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Policy Briefing

EU–Asia Relations Briefing — February 14, 2026

Published February 14, 2026 — 10:30 UTC

EU–Asia Relations Briefing — February 14, 2026

Automated policy briefing on EU–Asia Pacific relations generated with AI-powered web search.

Political Relations & Strategic Rivalry

Key Developments

  • Diplomatic Engagement at Munich Security Conference: On Friday, February 13, 2026, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with French Minister Jean-Noel Barrot and German MP Johann Wadephul on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference. Wang Yi asserted that China is not the source of Europe's economic and security challenges, advocating for a "rational and pragmatic policy" towards Beijing and emphasizing a partnership rather than an adversarial relationship.
  • China's Counter-Narrative on 'De-risking': A commentary published by Xinhua on February 12, 2026, argued that Europe's true "de-risking" should focus on reducing dependence on the United States, rather than China. This perspective, emerging from the Munich Security Conference context, suggests a Chinese effort to redirect the EU's de-risking strategy away from Beijing.
  • Absence of Recent Summits or New Sanctions: There have been no reported EU-China summits in the last 48 hours. Similarly, no new EU sanctions on Chinese entities linked to Russia's military-industrial complex have been announced within this timeframe; the most recent significant sanction packages targeting such entities were in February 2025 and June 2024.

Analysis

The latest developments underscore a persistent divergence in strategic perspectives between the EU and China, particularly concerning the 'de-risking' agenda and the broader geopolitical landscape. China's diplomatic push at the Munich Security Conference, coupled with its state media's narrative, indicates an active effort to influence the EU's strategic autonomy discourse and mitigate perceived anti-China sentiment. While direct high-level summits have not occurred recently, the ongoing diplomatic exchanges on the sidelines of major security conferences highlight the continued, albeit cautious, engagement. The lack of new sanctions against Chinese entities in the last 48 hours suggests a temporary pause or a focus on other aspects of the relationship, rather than a fundamental shift in the EU's concerns regarding China's role in supporting Russia's military-industrial complex.

Outlook

Strained
EU-China political relations remain strained, characterized by ongoing strategic rivalry and differing interpretations of global security and economic interdependence, with no significant breakthroughs or new agreements reported in the last 48 hours.

Economic Relations, Trade & Investment

Key Developments

  • EU imposes definitive anti-dumping duties on ABS from South Korea and Taiwan: On February 13, 2026, the European Commission announced definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of acrylonitrile-butadiene-styrene (ABS) resins from Taiwan and the Republic of Korea. These duties, ranging from 5.2% to 7.5% for South Korea and 10.9% to 21.7% for Taiwan, follow an in-depth investigation confirming injurious dumping practices affecting the €1.4 billion EU plastics market.
  • New EU tariff rules and additional duties on Chinese electric vehicles: As of February 12, 2026, the European Union has implemented new tariff rules and additional tariffs on Chinese-made electric vehicles, supplementing the existing 10% import duty. This move is part of the EU's ongoing investigation into alleged unfair subsidies benefiting Chinese exporters, aiming to rebalance trade ties with Beijing.
  • Tariff exemption granted for Volkswagen's China-manufactured EV: In a significant development on February 12, 2026, the EU approved a tariff exemption for Volkswagen's China-manufactured Cupra Tavascan electric SUV. This exemption is contingent upon Volkswagen agreeing to sell the model at a minimum price and meet an annual sales quota, offering a potential pathway for other Chinese EV makers seeking similar reprieves.

Analysis

The recent imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties on ABS from South Korea and Taiwan, coupled with new tariff rules and additional duties on Chinese electric vehicles, signals a more assertive EU trade defense posture. These measures reflect the EU's increasing focus on protecting its domestic industries from perceived unfair competition and market distortions, particularly from key Asian economies. The specific exemption granted to Volkswagen's China-made EV, however, suggests a nuanced approach, balancing protectionism with the realities of global supply chains and the interests of European companies operating in China. This dual strategy aims to safeguard European manufacturing jobs and market share while attempting to influence the behavior of trading partners and potentially encourage local production.

Outlook

Strained
The recent trade defense measures indicate a growing willingness by the EU to use tariffs to address perceived unfair trade practices, which is likely to introduce friction and uncertainty into EU-Asia economic relations.

Digital Policies & Innovation

Key Developments

  • EU-Singapore Digital Trade Agreement Enters into Force: The EU-Singapore Digital Trade Agreement (DTA) officially entered into force on February 1, 2026, marking the European Union's first standalone bilateral digital trade agreement. This agreement establishes transparent rules for cross-border digital transactions, aiming to provide legal certainty for businesses by promoting paperless trade, ensuring the validity of electronic signatures, and prohibiting customs duties on electronic transmissions. It also includes high-standard commitments on online consumer protection, personal data protection, and privacy measures, while prohibiting unjustified data localization requirements and forced transfers of software source code.
  • South Korea Launches Major AI Semiconductor Project: On February 11, 2026, South Korea announced a 1 trillion-won (approximately $687.8 million) project, set to commence in March, to develop on-device Artificial Intelligence (AI) semiconductors over the next five years. This national initiative, involving both government and private companies like Samsung Electronics and Hyundai Motor Group, aims to produce around 10 AI chips for applications in self-driving cars, smart home appliances, and humanoid robots. The project seeks to reduce the country's technological dependence on foreign AI chipmakers and strengthen its domestic semiconductor industry.
  • Horizon Europe Opens 2026 Calls for AI and 6G Research: The European Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking (SNS JU) under the Horizon Europe programme launched its 2026 calls for proposals on January 28, 2026, with a submission deadline of April 28, 2026. These calls include objectives directly relevant to AI and 6G, such as the "Collection, Generation and Validation of Datasets suitable for training AI Models for 6G Networks and for AIaaS" and the development of "6G Devices." While not explicitly focused on Asian partners in the call descriptions, Japan's successful conclusion of negotiations to associate with Horizon Europe, expected to be formalized in 2026, means Japanese entities can participate in these calls starting this year.

Analysis

The recent developments underscore a deepening and strategic engagement between the EU and key Asian partners in the digital domain. The entry into force of the EU-Singapore DTA sets a precedent for comprehensive digital trade rules, enhancing predictability and trust in cross-border digital transactions, which is crucial for increasing trade flows in digitally delivered services. South Korea's significant investment in AI semiconductors highlights a shared global priority in advanced computing, potentially opening avenues for future EU-Korea collaboration, especially as South Korea is expected to formally associate with Horizon Europe. Japan's impending association with Horizon Europe and the ongoing 6G and AI-related calls signal a concerted effort to foster joint research and innovation, aiming to strengthen strategic positioning in critical emerging technologies and reduce dependencies.

Outlook

Deepening
The recent entry into force of the EU-Singapore DTA, coupled with ongoing and prospective research collaborations under Horizon Europe with South Korea and Japan in critical digital technologies, indicates a clear trajectory towards more integrated and robust digital partnerships.

Security & Maritime Cooperation

Key Developments

  • EU-Sri Lanka Maritime Security Dialogue: On February 12, 2026, the European Union and Sri Lanka convened their 27th Joint Commission meeting in Colombo, where discussions included exploring ways to strengthen cooperation in the security field, notably on maritime security in the Indo-Pacific.
  • EU Condemns China's Actions in South China Sea: On February 13, 2026, the European External Action Service (EEAS) issued a statement condemning "dangerous actions by China Coast Guard vessels against lawful Philippine maritime operations" in the South China Sea, following recent incidents near the Sabina Shoal. In response, China expressed "strong dissatisfaction" with the EU's "accusations" and urged the bloc to be "objective and fair" on the issue.

Analysis

The recent EU engagement with Sri Lanka on maritime security underscores the EU's broader commitment to its Indo-Pacific Strategy, aiming to reinforce stability and security through partnerships beyond core ASEAN members. The direct and strong condemnation of China's actions in the South China Sea, despite Beijing's objections, highlights the EU's increasing assertiveness in upholding international law and freedom of navigation in critical waterways. This firm stance signals a growing alignment with regional partners concerned by Beijing's assertive behavior, potentially influencing trade flows by emphasizing secure maritime routes and impacting strategic positioning by strengthening the EU's role as a security actor in the region.

Outlook

Strained
The direct condemnation of China's actions in the South China Sea by the EU, met with a strong rebuke from Beijing, indicates increased friction in the security dimension of EU-Asia relations, particularly concerning maritime disputes.

Environment, Energy & Critical Raw Materials

Key Developments

  • EU's CBAM Impact on East Asian Manufacturers: On February 12, 2026, an Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) report highlighted that the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which entered its definitive phase on January 1, 2026, is increasing supply chain carbon risks for South Korean technology industries. The report projects potential CBAM certificate costs for South Korean chip exporters to reach USD 162 million by 2034 under a high EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) scenario, representing about 9.9% of total chip exports to the EU.
  • Potential CBAM Scope Expansion: The IEEFA report from February 12, 2026, also noted the potential future inclusion of semiconductors and liquefied natural gas (LNG) in the EU CBAM, which could significantly impact South Korea's technology sectors. Total CBAM certificate expenses for these industries are estimated to be approximately USD 588 million between 2026 and 2034.
  • EU's Critical Raw Material Dependence: A February 12, 2026, analysis by ECDPM, referencing a recent European Court of Auditors (ECA) special report, underscored the EU's persistent heavy reliance on single non-EU suppliers, particularly China, for critical raw materials. For instance, China supplies 97% of the EU's magnesium and 71% of its gallium.
  • Diversification Challenges in Critical Raw Materials: The same February 12, 2026, analysis indicated that achieving strategic autonomy in critical raw materials remains an unrealistic short-term goal for the EU. It suggests that diversifying the supply of refined minerals through partnerships with third countries, rather than solely focusing on domestic refining, could be a more pragmatic approach.
  • Green Energy Cooperation: There have been no specific new developments on green energy cooperation agreements or initiatives between the EU and Asia-Pacific countries reported within the last 48 hours. However, the EU and Sri Lanka held their 27th Joint Commission Meeting in Colombo on February 13, 2026, indicating ongoing broader diplomatic engagement.

Analysis

The latest developments indicate a period of significant adjustment and potential friction in EU-Asia relations, primarily driven by the operationalization and anticipated expansion of the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). East Asian manufacturers, particularly in carbon-intensive sectors and potentially technology industries like semiconductors, face increased compliance costs and pressure to decarbonize their production processes to maintain market access to the EU. Concurrently, the EU's continued high dependence on China for critical raw materials, despite legislative targets and diversification efforts, highlights a persistent vulnerability that could hinder its green transition and strategic autonomy. These trends suggest that while the EU aims to de-risk and diversify, the immediate impact on trade flows and strategic positioning for East Asian economies will be characterized by increased regulatory burdens and a push towards cleaner industrial practices.

Outlook

Strained
The immediate impacts of CBAM on East Asian manufacturers and the persistent challenges in critical raw material diversification point to increased trade friction and strategic competition, straining EU-Asia economic relations.

Sources

Grounding Sources (25)
japantimes.co.jp china.org.cn news.cn benninkdunin.com bakermckenzie.com arabnews.com europa.eu brusselstimes.com spglobal.com youtube.com alpadis.com tradecouncil.org dataguidance.com portugalglobal.pt koreatimes.co.kr ideal-ist.eu europa.eu innovationnewsnetwork.com europa.eu sciencebusiness.net europa.eu ddnews.gov.in ieefa.org pubaffairsbruxelles.eu europa.eu