SafePay

Ransomware and extortion · Origin not attributed
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APAC targets
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Techniques
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Incidents
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News · 30d
Profile
Type: Ransomware and extortion · Curated list of ransomware brands (aggregator.actor_catalogue)

SafePay ransomware started in October 2024 as a new ransomware service, using some of the leaked LockBit source code. Soon after launching, the group made a big impact in the ransomware world, hacking at least 33 organizations by December 9.

The first version of SafePay was created by modifying the LockBit source code. It adds the ".safepay" extension to files that it encrypts and includes a ransom note called "readme_safepay.txt." This version uses a three-step XOR method with a random single-byte key, making it hard for security researchers to analyse.

The group's technical infrastructure includes both a dark web blog and a presence on the TON network for victim communications. Their attack methodology follows a double extortion model, combining traditional file encryption with data theft to maximise pressure on victims. SafePay operators typically move from initial access to ransomware deployment in under 24 hours, significantly faster than the industry average. . Among the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) of the SafePay group, notable characteristics include the use of compromised VPN credentials as an initial access vector, extensive use of living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins), and sophisticated privilege escalation techniques. The group frequently employs ShareFinder.ps1 for network reconnaissance and uses WinRAR for data archival before exfiltration. Post encryption, SafePay directs victims to their negotiation portal accessible through both Tor and TON networks.

The group has demonstrated sophisticated operational security measures, including a Cyrillic-language-based killswitch that prevents execution in eastern European countries.

Related profiles: LockBit

Profiles whose description names this actor, that this description names, or that share one of its names. The sources mention them together; they are not necessarily the same group.

ATT&CK techniques
MITRE ATT&CK has no technique mapping for this actor.
Incidents attributed
Targets
No victim countries in the sources.
Relevance to the EU
EU relevance: Low
No EU member state among its known victims and no overlap with EU projects
No EU cooperation projects recorded in its target countries.
References
Profile from: MISP ransomware galaxy